Policy Analysis

Three experts discuss the fallout from the latest military strikes, along with the potential contours and implications of a newly announced agreement to halt the fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

As a landmark tool for tracking the group’s activity hits another sobering milestone, U.S. officials cannot let regional crises completely overshadow important shifts in jihadist threats around the world.

The Egyptian pound is weathering significant challenges to its stability as the Iran war continues to impact oil markets and Egypt's revenue streams, raising concerns about the longterm impact of continued conflict.

Asian market realities and the ongoing risks to energy investments inside Syria may put a damper on any large-scale infrastructure plans, though Damascus can better its prospects through further stabilization and reform efforts.

The Yemeni group has mostly stayed on the sidelines so far, but Washington should not mistake restraint for passivity.

Despite President Trump’s transformative goals in the Middle East and the ongoing need for American help in weathering multiple regional crises, the new budget request doubles down on a range of problematic funding cuts.

The Trump administration won’t achieve all of its war goals, but it could still notch a strategic win with time.

Flipping the kill switch is a potent exercise of authoritarian control, but expediting countermeasures like D2C can help prevent regimes from using this tactic in the future.

Tehran is hoping that its Persian Gulf Strait Authority will establish “facts on the ground” and give it leverage at the negotiating table, so Washington and its partners need to respond right away with a suite of military, economic, and diplomatic countermeasures.

Washington should treat the recent public discontent not as a sign that Syria’s transition is failing, but as an opportunity to help ensure that Damascus does not repeat the mistakes of previous governments.

U.S. and Israeli experts discuss the potential obstacles to progress in upcoming rounds of negotiations, and explain why keeping the Lebanon track separate from the Iran talks would be wise.

Although disarming the group is still crucial, negotiators need to realize that they will never really break Hezbollah’s hold on Lebanon so long as it retains Iranian support and key political allies and government posts in Beirut.

Tehran seems just as enthusiastic about the new prime minister as Washington—a telling sign that the militia-dominated status quo in Baghdad will be difficult and slow to change, if it changes at all.

Washington’s message to Syrian officials should be simple: foreign energy capital is unlikely to flow quickly as long as the outside world sees their government as an opaque regime with unclear authority, factional infighting, uncertain legal protections, and unresolved military tensions with powerful neighbors.

Power parity informs the view from Ankara, which has a strong interest in preventing Iran from going nuclear or alternatively falling into chaos—even as the war’s outcome will be largely outside Turkish control.

Some may read Xi’s approach as a strategy to make America expend its strength far from Chinese shores, but Beijing increasingly looks more like a regional power than a global superpower.

The war has shown that Iran’s one-way attack drones are highly adaptable tools of coercion and military effect, able to continue imposing costs across the Gulf region and beyond even after heavy losses.

Tehran’s drone ecosystem has been hit hard, but not at its roots—with help from Russia and China, the regime could restore many of the program’s capabilities within months while steadily working toward more dangerous next-generation models.

The years that President Sharaa’s circle spent managing Idlib province now look less like improvised wartime governance and more like a deliberate long-term project to build the cadres of a future state.

For decades, Tehran has repeatedly exploited Western diplomatic urgency to extract concessions, buy time, and refill its coffers; the answer is to turn time itself against the increasingly vulnerable regime.