Turkey

The president is very unlikely to win the next election fair and square, so he may well resort to undermining the vote, disregarding the result, or even fomenting a January 6-like insurrection.

By reassuring its Kurdish allies via temporary diplomatic, military, and economic measures, Washington can gain greater leverage over Russia and other players at acceptably low risk and cost.

Many Brotherhood members seem eager to exploit recent U.S.-Egyptian gestures on human rights, but there is little likelihood that the Sisi government will reconcile with the fractured, unpopular Islamist group.

Erdogan knows that a flourishing opposition could mean his political demise.

Moscow has repeatedly played actors off each other to secure its own interests and keep the Assad regime in power.

To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group.

The unprecedented economic growth and personal popularity once enjoyed by the Turkish leader have given way to stagnation, a dwindling support base, and problems abroad.

In addition to clarifying its intentions and fortifying its presence in the area, the U.S. government needs to increase its focus on stability, security, and economic development.

If only to avoid far worse outcomes, Washington should reject Assad’s bogus “reelection” and keep supporting Israeli strikes, the SDF’s viability, and refugee aid.