All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.

With Assad-era laws increasingly triggered by private complaints and enforced unevenly, U.S. officials can no longer relegate these issues to secondary tracks or assume that core administration objectives will remain unaffected.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

As a landmark tool for monitoring the group’s activity hits another sobering milestone, U.S. officials cannot let regional crises completely overshadow important shifts in jihadist threats around the world.

Washington should treat the recent public discontent not as a sign that Syria’s transition is failing, but as an opportunity to help ensure that Damascus does not repeat the mistakes of previous governments.

The years that President Sharaa’s circle spent managing Idlib province now look less like improvised wartime governance and more like a deliberate long-term project to build the cadres of a future state.

By taking urgent steps to institutionalize the wartime partnerships formed with (and between) Ukraine, the Gulf states, and Syria, Congress can strike heavy long-term blows against hostile Russian influence in the Middle East.

The war’s effects on Syria have largely fallen below the radar, yet no one should forget how much has changed there since 2024, nor how important it is to preserve the government’s accomplishments against Iran and its partners while acknowledging the conflict’s local economic consequences.

The two conflicts may appear unrelated, but an al-Qaeda haven in Iran, threats from the Islamic State, and separatist ambitions could supercharge the risks to regional and global security.

Washington Institute experts assess the immediate fallout of the Syrian government’s advance into SDF-held parts of the northeast, including mutual disinformation campaigns, implications for the Islamic State threat, the terms of new agreements with the Kurds, and the calculus of outside actors like the United States, Israel, and Turkey.

Although some Christians have been targeted post-Assad, these incidents are hardly an attempted "genocide," but rather part of the broader internal security challenge affecting all communities in Syria, including the majority population.

A former U.S. envoy to Syria joins an expert on President Sharaa’s ruling faction to discuss how Damascus should approach governance issues one year after the fall of Assad.

The transitional leadership can claim several successes, but a shadow government, opaque economic practices, and uneven accountability for former regime crimes could undermine progress.

An in-depth look at the legal regime that Syria's transitional authorities have put in place to deal with religious minorities, focusing on how its policies have played out in a climate of ongoing violence and public distrust.

After meeting with Sharaa and returning from an extensive research trip in Syria, a Washington Institute expert sheds light on the president’s UN speech, near-term plans, and views on the U.S. role.

A panel of American, Israeli, and Syrian experts discuss the prospects of cooperation and normalization between the two longtime belligerents, including the U.S. role in achieving such a deal.

Although skepticism is understandable given the background of those now leading Syria’s government and security forces, removing the FTO designation is an unprecedented counterterrorism decision with numerous potential benefits and ripple effects.

Although definitively identifying the group responsible for the bombing may take more time, authorities in Damascus and Washington already have more than enough information to beef up their security cooperation and reassure Syrian minorities that they won’t be targeted.

Beijing specializes in exactly the type of infrastructure reconstruction assistance that Syria so urgently needs and may look to exploit any further delays or prohibitions stemming from U.S. export controls.

An in-depth study of how the Islamic State’s administrative apparatus and activities in its Syrian “capital” affected local residents, and how it sought to instrumentalize the populace in a quest to sustain its wider international state-building project for the long term.