All Policy Analysis by Aaron Y. Zelin

Although Israeli authorities have silently and capably dealt with an uptick in IS plots since October 7, the threat continues to grow.

To prevent the type of jihadist resurgence seen after past U.S. military departures, Washington will need to sustain counterterrorism support and close any political, security, and detention gaps that IS could exploit.

America’s institutional knowledge about global jihadist terrorism took decades to accumulate, but it could disappear much faster.

Although America’s defensive and preventive mechanisms are much stronger today, the global jihadist situation in 2026 is uncomfortably similar to the 1990s, when the movement was treated as a manageable nuisance even as it quietly consolidated sanctuaries, built financial autonomy, and experimented with new methods of attack.

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.

With Assad-era laws increasingly triggered by private complaints and enforced unevenly, U.S. officials can no longer relegate these issues to secondary tracks or assume that core administration objectives will remain unaffected.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

As a landmark tool for monitoring the group’s activity hits another sobering milestone, U.S. officials cannot let regional crises completely overshadow important shifts in jihadist threats around the world.

Washington should treat the recent public discontent not as a sign that Syria’s transition is failing, but as an opportunity to help ensure that Damascus does not repeat the mistakes of previous governments.

The years that President Sharaa’s circle spent managing Idlib province now look less like improvised wartime governance and more like a deliberate long-term project to build the cadres of a future state.

By taking urgent steps to institutionalize the wartime partnerships formed with (and between) Ukraine, the Gulf states, and Syria, Congress can strike heavy long-term blows against hostile Russian influence in the Middle East.

The war’s effects on Syria have largely fallen below the radar, yet no one should forget how much has changed there since 2024, nor how important it is to preserve the government’s accomplishments against Iran and its partners while acknowledging the conflict’s local economic consequences.

The two conflicts may appear unrelated, but an al-Qaeda haven in Iran, threats from the Islamic State, and separatist ambitions could supercharge the risks to regional and global security.

Washington Institute experts assess the immediate fallout of the Syrian government’s advance into SDF-held parts of the northeast, including mutual disinformation campaigns, implications for the Islamic State threat, the terms of new agreements with the Kurds, and the calculus of outside actors like the United States, Israel, and Turkey.

Although some Christians have been targeted post-Assad, these incidents are hardly an attempted "genocide," but rather part of the broader internal security challenge affecting all communities in Syria, including the majority population.

A former U.S. envoy to Syria joins an expert on President Sharaa’s ruling faction to discuss how Damascus should approach governance issues one year after the fall of Assad.

The transitional leadership can claim several successes, but a shadow government, opaque economic practices, and uneven accountability for former regime crimes could undermine progress.

An in-depth look at the legal regime that Syria's transitional authorities have put in place to deal with religious minorities, focusing on how its policies have played out in a climate of ongoing violence and public distrust.

After meeting with Sharaa and returning from an extensive research trip in Syria, a Washington Institute expert sheds light on the president’s UN speech, near-term plans, and views on the U.S. role.

A panel of American, Israeli, and Syrian experts discuss the prospects of cooperation and normalization between the two longtime belligerents, including the U.S. role in achieving such a deal.