Syria

Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization—historically based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region—and its various branches to adapt and migrate outward. In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin

The retaliatory attacks against alleged Islamic State facilities in eastern Syria apparently failed to hit any of their intended targets, undermining Iranian deterrence and raising questions about the effectiveness of Iran's missile force.

The United States cannot defeat the Islamic State without first reckoning with Iran's nefarious role in Syria.

The Institute's leading Russia expert outlines the best means of tempering Moscow's influence in the region, recommending a more active U.S. military and diplomatic role while explaining why Putin will never be a reliable partner there.

As Washington considers its next steps in northern Syria, it will need to weigh the geostrategic consequences of backing local Kurdish forces whose objectives may align or conflict with those of Russia, Iran, and various other actors.

Whatever understandings the Trump administration reaches after the Islamic State is defeated, it needs to be clear about the stakes: if America does not stop the Iranians in Syria and Iraq, they will soon emerge as the region's dominant force.

Various players have been rushing to secure their spot in former Islamic State strongholds that will be strategically important to the next phase of the war.

Despite setbacks in Syria, and anxieties over a potential future conflict with Israel, the group has substantially widened its reach in recent years.

Syria and Lebanon have always had a contentious border, but the Syrian war -- and its different factions -- have made it far more complex than before.