All Policy Analysis by Patrick Clawson

Given his strong ties to the IRGC, Khamenei’s son might pursue extreme strategic options.

Washington Institute experts assess the immediate implications of U.S.-Israeli military strikes on Iran, including the regime’s future after major leadership losses, reactions inside Iran and Lebanon, the fallout for the Gulf states, the contours of potential diplomacy once the fighting stops, and more.

No matter what President Trump may say about potentially securing “a good deal” from Iran, refraining from military action after weeks of dire U.S. warnings would likely convince Tehran that it can strike fear in other governments.

Acting now offers the best chance to halt atrocities and shape a peaceful transition, while waiting would only ensure that the next phase of the crisis is bloodier for Iranians, more dangerous for the region, and more difficult to influence.

Leaders in Tehran are saying they won the June war and can stand up to Israel, leaving U.S. policymakers with the tricky task of how to stand up to Iran.

Reimposing old sanctions may not have much economic impact if China sidesteps them, but Washington could still use the mechanism to pressure Iran on returning to negotiations.

The Supreme Leader and his domestic echo chambers have shown a remarkable shift in emphasis from religious authority to full-throated pre-revolutionary nationalism, and Washington should adjust its messaging accordingly.

A compilation of views on the next round of prospective talks with Iran, sanctions relief options, military and technical considerations, the international role, and more.

The most important restrictions include measures like permanently dismantling enrichment infrastructure and properly disposing of key materials and equipment, but policymakers need to be clear-eyed about the inherent limitations of even the strictest verification agreement.

A compilation of analyses on the military and nuclear impact of Israel’s initial strikes, Tehran’s response options, the Trump administration’s next steps, public reactions inside Iran, and more.

The United States should recognize consortia concepts for what they are: face-saving steps rather than cure-alls for the nonproliferation problems created by Iran’s nuclear activities.

When it comes to fixing serious problems with the economy, energy, and other sectors, the reformists have been just as ineffective as the hardliners, eroding any legitimacy they might claim to reopen nuclear negotiations with Washington.

The country faces shortages of gasoline, natural gas, and electricity that make it newly susceptible to pressure against its oil product imports, not just its oil exports.

Poor internal communications and miscalculation could lead Tehran to continue the cycle by striking again soon, whether directly or through its Iraqi proxies.

Three experts discuss the domestic and foreign implications of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidential election victory—including the need to temper any expectations that he is able or willing to pursue substantial change.

Iran’s new reformist president will need time to generate consensus at home before making any significant foreign policy moves; Washington should do the same.

Allowing a runoff in the presidential election is a somewhat risky move for the Supreme Leader, but engineering a one-round outcome would raise domestic problems of its own.

Iranian presidential elections often produce surprise results, so a victory by Pezeshkian, the one reformist candidate, cannot be ruled out.

Few of the prospective candidates have shown much interest in or talent for national security affairs, and none has articulated a vision for tamping down Iran’s aggression at home or abroad.

As in past elections, the contest to determine a replacement for the late President Raisi will be less about the people’s choice and more about what direction the Supreme Leader wants the Islamic Republic to go.