All Policy Analysis by Patrick Clawson

Leaders in Tehran are saying they won the June war and can stand up to Israel, leaving U.S. policymakers with the tricky task of how to stand up to Iran.

Reimposing old sanctions may not have much economic impact if China sidesteps them, but Washington could still use the mechanism to pressure Iran on returning to negotiations.

The Supreme Leader and his domestic echo chambers have shown a remarkable shift in emphasis from religious authority to full-throated pre-revolutionary nationalism, and Washington should adjust its messaging accordingly.

A compilation of views on the next round of prospective talks with Iran, sanctions relief options, military and technical considerations, the international role, and more.

The most important restrictions include measures like permanently dismantling enrichment infrastructure and properly disposing of key materials and equipment, but policymakers need to be clear-eyed about the inherent limitations of even the strictest verification agreement.

A compilation of analyses on the military and nuclear impact of Israel’s initial strikes, Tehran’s response options, the Trump administration’s next steps, public reactions inside Iran, and more.

The United States should recognize consortia concepts for what they are: face-saving steps rather than cure-alls for the nonproliferation problems created by Iran’s nuclear activities.

When it comes to fixing serious problems with the economy, energy, and other sectors, the reformists have been just as ineffective as the hardliners, eroding any legitimacy they might claim to reopen nuclear negotiations with Washington.

The country faces shortages of gasoline, natural gas, and electricity that make it newly susceptible to pressure against its oil product imports, not just its oil exports.

Poor internal communications and miscalculation could lead Tehran to continue the cycle by striking again soon, whether directly or through its Iraqi proxies.

Three experts discuss the domestic and foreign implications of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidential election victory—including the need to temper any expectations that he is able or willing to pursue substantial change.

Iran’s new reformist president will need time to generate consensus at home before making any significant foreign policy moves; Washington should do the same.

Allowing a runoff in the presidential election is a somewhat risky move for the Supreme Leader, but engineering a one-round outcome would raise domestic problems of its own.

Iranian presidential elections often produce surprise results, so a victory by Pezeshkian, the one reformist candidate, cannot be ruled out.

Few of the prospective candidates have shown much interest in or talent for national security affairs, and none has articulated a vision for tamping down Iran’s aggression at home or abroad.

As in past elections, the contest to determine a replacement for the late President Raisi will be less about the people’s choice and more about what direction the Supreme Leader wants the Islamic Republic to go.

The regime has been able to drive economic growth, stifle mass protests, and expand its infiltration of neighboring countries, but lingering existential concerns could spur it toward even bolder courses of action—including potential nuclear breakout.

The October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel represent a turning point that should bring home oft-overlooked realities about the Middle East and compel U.S. policymakers to rethink preconceptions about the region and America's role and interests in it.

A recently leaked document—if genuine—may indicate substantial internal skepticism toward the regime’s handling of the current domestic crisis, and perhaps even pressure for limited reforms.

The regime still has additional means of making the crackdown even more lethal, and parts of the country are potentially primed to take up arms in response, with uncertain consequences on the ground.