All Policy Analysis by Patrick Clawson

Mass support for reformists has disappeared among Iran’s severely disenchanted electorate, leaving Hemmati and his circle with little means of avoiding dismal turnout and vote tallies.

Read or watch an expert conversation on the immediate and long-term effects of the Islamic Republic’s response to the pandemic. How will Iranian politics change? How much aid can Tehran get under sanctions? How will the global economic slowdown affect daily life there?

Washington often objects to loans that it deems insufficiently rigorous, but its blocking attempts usually fail—and Iran has no need for the funds anyway.

Total U.S. production from all sources will remain the world’s largest no matter how low prices go, leaving Washington (and Texas) with considerable room to help domestic companies and press Riyadh and Moscow on stabilizing prices.

Mass funerals aside, his image as the quintessential Iranian nationalist made most Middle Easterners wary or actively hostile toward him, so the United States is unlikely to face popular reprisals following his death.

Rouhani has taken a remarkably austere fiscal approach ahead of the looming parliamentary election, but the country’s economic situation is still not sustainable over the long run.

The Supreme Leader faces tough choices about who to blame for the protests, and what impact they should have on policy toward the United States.

The demonstrations indicate widespread popular rejection of the political system, but this same system remains well organized to deflect and counter unrest.

The Supreme Leader regards his rule as the central feature of the Islamic Revolution, so the latest White House order will seem like a shot at the entire system.

Washington should phase out the oil waivers carefully and prevent Chabahar port from becoming an escape valve for Iran.

Neither blanket extension nor wholesale cancellation is the best course, but several of the expiring waivers would serve U.S. interests if properly—and publicly—revised.

The practical effects may be limited to minor issues such as visa regulations, while the symbolic implications are not in Tehran's favor.

Historically a reliable indicator of Khamenei’s thinking, the Supreme Leader’s annual Mashhad address focused mainly on foreign policy, especially why the West should not be trusted, along with his usual call for Iran to develop its non-oil economy.

The impact of imminent sanctions will be magnified by the economy’s recent struggles, and Tehran’s bad financial policies will only make matters worse.

The current Iranian narrative—that economic problems stem from domestic mistakes rather than foreign pressure—complicates the U.S. policy of using sanctions to force change.

Today, Syria is the sole battlefield in the world where American, Russian, Turkish, Iranian, and Israeli military forces all operate, along with a kaleidoscope of proxy actors foreign and domestic. As the preeminent arena of strategic competition in the Middle East and a wellspring of potential Islamic State resurgence, Syria