All Policy Analysis by Soner Cagaptay

The potential economic and strategic benefits of reopening the northern Iraqi pipeline are clear, but the agreement still faces bureaucratic, political, and security challenges before exports can resume in earnest.

The Turkish president has shown he will use harsh tactics to suppress the popular opposition party, but his future decisions could still be swayed by domestic protests, economic factors, and geopolitics.

The director of the Institute’s Turkish Research Program testifies on why Ankara remains vitally important to U.S. policy in the Middle East and the great power arena despite its major domestic shifts in mosque-state relations under President Erdogan.

Despite long opposing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Ankara has a strong national security interest in avoiding moves that result in either direct Turkish hostilities with Iran or the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

A former Israeli military official and a Turkey expert discuss what each government wants from Syria, how they can address their most glaring friction points, and what the Trump administration can do to mediate the process.

Although past peace efforts have fallen apart due to diplomatic stumbles and Kurdish opposition, the situation on the ground in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey has changed dramatically enough to warrant optimism about Ankara’s current talks.

If Ankara seals the deal and preempts potential spoilers, the results could prove historic for Turkish politics, Erdogan’s legacy, joint counterterrorism efforts, and wider U.S. regional interests.

Ankara and Washington should offer incentives to the new leadership in Damascus to encourage an inclusive governance process and make Syria work.

The two leaders can use their personal rapport to solve bilateral and regional problems, but they will also face tough challenges in matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dealings with China.

In this episode of the Institute’s Syria Breakdown series, Turkey analyst Soner Cagaptay traces the revolutionary transformation of Ankara's relationship with Damascus from heated enemies to the closest of allies.

Despite his latest tweets about staying out of the Syria crisis, Trump has a history of working with Turkey on these issues and has several carrots to offer HTS as well.

Having observed two decades of instability across its southern borders and anticipating U.S. withdrawals, Ankara is planning steps to end the volatility, including potentially wide-ranging agreements with the Assad regime.

Ankara’s push for “soft recentralization” in Iraq will likely include more intensive efforts to establish the Development Road and prioritize Baghdad’s interests, though without abandoning the Kurdistan Region.

Even with U.S. intercession, the assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran could harden Ankara’s stance against Israel and spur a fatal cycle of diplomatic and economic retaliation.

From water rights to PKK violence, a recent summit seemed to remove several long-festering thorns from the bilateral relationship, creating potential challenges and benefits alike for U.S. interests in Iraq and beyond.

Although the latest rift is more than rhetorical, Ankara is unlikely to sever ties completely—unless Israel blocks it from participating in Gaza’s reconstruction.

If the president’s faction takes the city back from the opposition on March 31, he may feel comfortable enough to focus on more positive legacy-building steps, but a loss could see him double down on nativist and populist policies at home and abroad.

Once Washington comes to grips with Erdogan’s “Anatolian” foreign policy, it will have a better chance of steering the relationship in ways that support U.S. interests without unduly boosting Russia and other adversaries.

Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad.

His months-long efforts to neuter the opposition ahead of this weekend’s win suggest that Turkey is shifting closer to a Putin-style autocracy than an illiberal European democracy.