All Policy Analysis by حمدی ملک

Sabereen News has seemingly broadened its capabilities to include simple hacking tactics like DDoS attacks, and it might quickly proceed to more complex exploits.

کانال خبری صابرین از ۲۸ مارس تا ۸ آوریل تقریبا به‌طور کامل تعطیل بود ‌ــ‌هر چند با تلاشی آشکار از سوی اعضای متمرد برای سرپیچی از تعلیق و مقصر دانستن ایران.

همزمان با بهبود فنی کانال خبری صابرین وابسته به شبه‌نظامیان، پوشش بحران اوکراین از سوی این کانال حتی از افراطی‌ترین رسانه‌های طرفدار روسیه در عراق فراتر رفت.

شبه‌نظامیان درمانده عراقی اکنون دارند برای ترور بازرسان و نیروهای اطلاعاتی عراق بمب‌گذاری‌هایی می کنند که با تلفات مردمی همراه است و، در واقع، به کشتن غیرنظامیان عراقی مشغول اند .

هر دو رسانه «صابرین» و «یگان ۱۰۰۰۰» علناً از قتل نیروهای امنیتی عراق در زمان تشدید تیراندازی‌ها و بمب‌گذاری‌ها حمایت می کنند.

With its first Kurdish-language video, the militia has upped the stakes by hinting at regime change in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The unmasking of Abu Hussein and his brothers puts the deposed Kataib Hezbollah official on the receiving end of his favorite tactic: leaking the faces and names of rivals.

سردار ایرانی هرگز با چنین تمجیدهای اغراق‌آمیزی از جانب نیروهای «مقاومت» عراق روبرو نبوده است، اما ممکن است اینها فقط سرپوشی برای شرمساری از سفر نومیدکننده اخیر او به عراق باشد.

With probable links to Kataib Hezbollah, this minor facade group claimed a major rocket attack on al-Asad Air Base, but mainly limits itself to claimed bombings against U.S. supply convoys.

A closer look at the "resistance" television channel owned and operated by U.S.-designated terrorist movement Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

The Iran-backed militia tried to make its solo effort to boost the Houthi drone arsenal look like a widely coordinated and highly popular campaign, whereas it was anything but.

گروه‌های تندرو عراق از یک سو می خواهند تقاضای طرفداران خود را برای اقدام علیه نیروهای آمریکایی برآورده کنند و از سوی دیگر مانع از افزایش تنش‌ بین آمریکا و ایران شوند و همزمان بازوهای غیرنظامی خود را توسعه دهند.

Recent moves by the senior PMF commander are seemingly aimed at sowing divisions among four key militias that do not answer to the so-called "resistance."

A minor sub-group took credit for recent airport strikes, indicating a return to the "facade" strategy and a role for AAH in the latest escalation.

Iran-backed groups seem to be directing their more dangerous attacks against coalition forces in Syria, not Iraq, and the trend could accelerate in early 2022.

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada may have exaggerated its recruiting numbers, but the episode points to militias' desperation to look potent and regain leverage by threatening to destabilize Iraq in early 2022.

Elements of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah are seemingly trying to extract domestic and Iranian support for more forceful pushback against their recent political isolation.

Militias followed up Qais al-Khazali's threats against Kadhimi by attacking his residence, shattering the narrative of victimhood they had been building through protests.

In the wake of their failed election campaigns and other recent setbacks, militias sought to deepen their claims of victimhood and politically damage Prime Minister Kadhimi with protests.

The recent attack on al-Tanf base and the identity of the Iraqi factions that reportedly helped carry it out indicate Iran's plans to establish a new "deterrence equation" in Syria.