Policy Analysis

As long as the Strait of Hormuz is fully reopened and enriched uranium is shipped out, ending the war quickly may be Washington’s best bet, since Tehran would be left to deal with dire domestic problems it has no answer for.

The military and diplomatic risks of reentering south Lebanon are weighty, but Israel can mitigate them by publicly clarifying its security objectives, pursuing a bilateral political horizon, focusing its military efforts, and (finally) holding officials in Beirut accountable.

Although U.S. officials should keep pushing Baghdad to move against these groups, the Iran war has demonstrated the need to seek other avenues of pressure and recalibrate the bilateral relationship.

Beyond the widely discussed risk of energy shocks, the war also seems likely to spark a prolonged debt crisis, especially for the world’s poorest nations.

The debates sparked by Decree No. 39 raise questions about how the country will bridge the troubling gaps between official government discourse and victims’ rights.

The longstanding balance of Gulf security—in which states quietly maintained ties with Tehran while relying on Washington as the ultimate guarantor—is now under strain, making the future of their investment flows into the United States difficult to judge.

As wider peace negotiations continue, U.S. officials should carefully consider the many moving parts needed for a proxies deal to succeed—and what Washington would do if Tehran starts flagrantly violating its terms.

If the international community lags on the Sudan file or allows local forces to keep treating peace conferences as just another arena for their rivalries, the result will be even more space for bad actors to massacre civilians and loot the country’s wealth.

Three former U.S. policy practitioners experienced in negotiating with Iran discuss what kind of agreement is possible, what each side may require to make it happen, and how officials in Washington, Israel, the Gulf states, and Europe should address emerging differences in their objectives.

Join us for an expert conversation examining the current mood among Iranians and the ways the regime uses digital repression to maintain power. Watch live starting at 11:30 a.m. EDT (1530 GMT) on Friday, April 10, 2026.

Even if Washington somehow convinces Iran to cut off support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, this would not eliminate the threat they pose.

As seen with Hamas during the Gaza war, media outlets and international officials are spreading untruths about Israel’s latest campaign against Hezbollah; thankfully, the playbook for countering them is clear this time.

Why did the group strike now, what might they do next, and how could it affect the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran?

The crisis will challenge economic and political stability in the Maghreb countries, but they will also have opportunities—with Washington’s help—to fortify their prewar progress by filling gaps in global energy markets and other key sectors affected by the war.

However the conflict ends, it has already delivered pivotal lessons on U.S. military innovation and political strategy, the continued dominance of hydrocarbons, the future posture of regional and external powers, and more.

Trump’s fifteen-point peace proposal suggests that he recognizes the need to find an off-ramp, but Washington must stay committed to that path to avoid a Russian-style quagmire.

His appointment as SNSC secretary shows that the regime is relying on a veteran hardliner to manage the crisis and preserve control.

The monthlong conflict and developments in Gaza have weakened the terrorist group’s connection to Tehran, offering Washington an opportunity to achieve its goals by working through Qatar and Turkey as well as Egypt.

With its leadership badly damaged and its security establishment humiliated by deep intelligence infiltration, the desperate regime likely sees little downside in setting caution aside and greenlighting a wide variety of international attacks.

The U.S. metric for effective cooperation shouldn’t be whether Syria is willing to fight Iran’s proxies in Lebanon or Iraq, but whether it continues advancing regional stability by securing its borders, limiting the flow of Iranian weapons and fighters, and coordinating politically with neighbors.