Policy Analysis

With Assad-era laws increasingly triggered by private complaints and enforced unevenly, U.S. officials can no longer relegate these issues to secondary tracks or assume that core administration objectives will remain unaffected.

Ukrainian cooperation with Gulf states on drone and counter-drone technologies is expanding as they contend with similar threats and concerns, so Washington should do whatever it can to enable and coordinate this growth.

Join us for a conversation with three former directors of the National Counterterrorism Center as they look back on a quarter century of combating the global terrorist threat. Watch live starting at 9:00 a.m. EDT (1300 GMT) on Tuesday, September 8, 2026.

In launching its newly announced “Operation Economic Outcast,” the Trump administration’s primary beachhead should be the UAE, which has signaled a shift in the right direction but will need targeted U.S. help with cutting off illicit Iranian transactions.

Libyans are fed up with temporary solutions, but Washington’s current approach is structured to be just that—another transitional phase that lets political elites keep postponing elections and reform.

International actors, while expressing confidence in the country’s political progress, struggled to adapt to economic resistance from the national labor union, the destabilizing effects of terrorism, and interference from outside actors.

The United States eased its fertilizer restrictions on the kingdom to manage a supply emergency, but Morocco could also become a key source of purified phosphoric acid—a crucial product tied to growing competition with China over battery production, supply chain integrity, and access to critical minerals.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

Iraqi sales to Asian markets rely heavily on the strait, and efforts to establish viable alternative routes would have to overcome considerable logistical challenges—not to mention Baghdad’s bad track record with pipelines.

The author’s return to a post-Assad Syria revealed grounds for hope—but also sobering reminders of how far the country has to go in shoring up its economy, governance, and internal security.

The success of his latest trip should be measured by whether he can expedite preparations for practical issues like policing and weapons collection so that the Gaza transition plan remains viable after Israel’s election.

The more the LAF demonstrates it can enforce state authority in disarming Hezbollah, the less Israel will be compelled to continue its operations, and the more it will be inclined to gradually withdraw—though neither side can succeed without sustained U.S. leadership, a clear verification mechanism, and appropriate limits on international involvement.

Libyans are increasingly questioning where governance reforms fit into the agendas of Libyan elites' engagement with the parallel UNSMIL 2025 roadmap and Boulos initiative.

The breakdown in Israeli relations with Turkey did not eliminate Jerusalem’s obstacle to recognizing the Armenian genocide; that hesitation has merely been shifted to Azerbaijan.

Despite the group’s assent, major gaps remain with Israel over sequencing, disarmament, and oversight, casting doubt on the agreement’s feasibility.

The June MOU and the 2013 JPOA are not perfect analogues, but the deliberately limited terms and careful specificity of the latter agreement hold prudent lessons for both Washington and Tehran as they contemplate a potential new round of direct negotiations.

Despite recent high-profile arrests, transatlantic authorities won’t be able to meet their longer-term goals of stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza unless they take broader action against still-rampant Hamas fundraising.

Washington and Beirut have made significant strides toward curtailing Hezbollah’s military arsenal, but dismantling the group’s “aspiring martyr” pipeline is no less important.

Any postwar system must preserve the “transit passage” regime, enable ships to safely resume use of the original IMO route, and reject mandatory fees, veto rights, or other Iranian tactics for exerting permanent control over one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

The Gulf needs a joint front on deterrence, engagement, and freedom of navigation.