Policy Analysis

Unless Washington lays out clear principles on Hamas, the differing strategic views that Ankara, Cairo, and Doha hold toward the group will inevitably erode their cooperation, especially as the implementation process enters more difficult terrain.

To prevent the type of jihadist resurgence seen after past U.S. military departures, Washington will need to sustain counterterrorism support and close any political, security, and detention gaps that IS could exploit.

A veteran Israeli intelligence and defense official assesses the country’s military strategy in Gaza since the ceasefire and makes recommendations for the path forward.

The memory of October 7 will still drive Israeli politics no matter which government comes to power, but this should not stop Washington from calling out strategic mistakes and reminding Jerusalem that other populations have suffered as well.

A major Lebanese political leader explains why Beirut’s exaggerated fears of “civil war” with Hezbollah are no excuse for stalling efforts to confront the group and its Iranian patron.

Despite relinquishing official authority, Hamas has maintained decentralized systems of governance and financing in Gaza and is attempting to expand its influence in the West Bank as well.

Ankara appears to be moving toward greater alignment with U.S. sanctions, but its willingness to commit to full cooperation remains in question.

Former American, Israeli, and PA officials reflect on the anniversary of the October 7 attack and the devastating war that followed, offering practical ideas for gradually closing the enormous trust gap that has reopened since 2023.

Two former senior U.S. officials look back at what the ceasefire has produced—and failed to produce—in its first year of implementation, focusing on the underused leverage provided by the July 30 “roadmap” agreement with Hamas.

The Trump administration should be prepared to push a suite of concrete actions immediately after Israel’s election, from delivering urgently needed interim housing to convening high-level meetings with regional mediators and avoiding steps that signal abandonment of the PA.

American negotiators may be feeling pressure to achieve a deal, but they should also appreciate and capitalize on the mounting economic strain facing leaders in Tehran.

Israel does not seem to be planning any major new security steps before the vote to address tensions with Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Turkey, and that same caution may linger with the next government—but for how long?

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Washington should use this summit to convince China to put more pressure on Iran and establish safeguards on AI, but without conceding on other critical issues like Taiwan.

Given this month’s shifting threat picture, the administration should push for another compromise deal similar to the June MOU—though getting Iran back to the table will require accepting certain escalatory risks and providing more concrete security guarantees to increasingly vulnerable Gulf partners.

Acts of violence by extremist settlers have risen sharply in scale and severity, shifting from largely reactive incidents to a more proactive, strategic effort aimed at displacing Palestinian communities and seizing territory.

Although the unprecedented decision to jointly prohibit trade with settlements raises difficult diplomatic and political questions amid a weighty Israeli election cycle, the announcement will also have important effects beyond that date, signaling that many countries will prioritize this issue in their relations with whatever government voters choose.

As the September 30 disarmament deadline for PMF militias approaches, Washington should support the Zaidi government’s efforts and ensure that the militias’ concessions are real.

Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman have provided a helpful export alternative for regional oil producers, but this shuttle trade will likely remain a target for Iranian attacks.

Some textual concerns persist, such as how to handle the risk of Saudi cheating and avoid setting bad precedents, but the official agreement has several worthwhile provisions that reduce the intrinsic risk of nuclear trade.