اسرائیل

The conflict in June 2025 laid bare longstanding misconceptions about escalation management with the regime and could hold lessons as the United States contemplates further military action.

The NCAG’s viability will depend on producing quick, tangible deliverables, so the Trump administration, the Board of Peace, and the High Representative should stand ready to provide the requisite support on staving off Hamas and PA obstructionism and cutting through Israeli red tape.

Washington Institute experts assess the immediate fallout of the Syrian government’s advance into SDF-held parts of the northeast, including mutual disinformation campaigns, implications for the Islamic State threat, the terms of new agreements with the Kurds, and the calculus of outside actors like the United States, Israel, and Turkey.

Israel may believe the tense status quo is sustainable, but Washington is frustrated about the potential implications for Arab normalization, Turkish military friction, and near-term economic plans.

Defining victory in Gaza is hardly simple when Hamas is still armed, ruling nearly half the Strip, and flush with significant diplomatic achievements.

Barring sustained U.S. efforts, Gaza’s de facto division into Hamas and Israeli zones will likely persist, and the ceasefire will be remembered as just the prelude to the next conflict.

If Netanyahu and Sisi meet this month, Washington should press both leaders to treat the summit as the beginning of a structured trilateral process on Gaza, not a one-off symbolic encounter.

Strong outside supervision over Lebanon’s implementation of the Hezbollah disarmament plan could help forestall looming Israeli military escalation and protect recent diplomatic milestones on the road toward an eventual peace treaty.

Gaza stabilization must include precise disarmament rules, independent monitoring, and pressure from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to counter Hamas’s blend of flexibility and intransigence.