Policy Analysis

After two decades of decline for America’s world image, the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan will alter Middle East perspectives about American promise and dominance.

In Iraq, pre-election polls indicate likely difficulties for Tishreen protest movement to translate popular support into electoral gains, due to widespread concerns about electoral legitimacy and political violence.

Similarities between the two cases include heavy patronage politics and militia intimidation, but Baghdad has advantages that could help it avoid Kabul’s fate.

Much ink has been spilled about a potential al-Qaeda comeback, but the Taliban’s return could also send insurgents and refugees streaming toward China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.

Since the fall of Kabul—and well beforehand—Iranian officials have signaled how they might use a Taliban victory to further their goals in the Middle East, though they remain concerned about the fate of Afghan Shia.

Regardless of the Taliban’s promises to keep foreign terrorist elements in check, its victory is already boosting elements within the jihadist movement and may once again spur foreign fighter traffic to Afghanistan.

Whether or not Russian leaders genuinely believe the Taliban will turn into a responsible stakeholder, they will likely be rewarded with more international and regional clout at Washington’s expense.

Moscow is keen on courting Ethiopia, and Cairo is beginning to realize its partner’s limitations, yet the two governments will nevertheless continue cooperating on hot-button issues like weapons procurement.

Institute scholars share their insights into how the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rapid fall of the country to the Taliban will affect the American strategic position across the Middle East and our relationships with allies, partners, and adversaries

The question is whether and how these historical echoes will affect decisionmaking in Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, and India.

Relying on geostrategic advantages and the absence of substantial opposition, ISIS seeks to reconfigure itself in the Syrian and Iraqi deserts in order to expand its control.

The announcement raises several awkward geopolitical questions, but market factors may ultimately make U.S. pressure moot.

Whether or not Tunis repeats its past security mistakes, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State may see the president’s destabilizing power move as an opportunity to prod the government’s capabilities.

If the United States does not respond to the drone strike off Oman, it could impair rather than facilitate progress on the JCPOA talks.

To make UNIFIL more effective and prevent dangerous destabilization in the south, the Security Council should review the force’s mandate more frequently, reallocate its resources to better fit its mission, make reporting more transparent and accurate, and hold the government and LAF accountable for their obstruction.

To dispel confusion among America’s partners and better counter its adversaries, the administration will have to do a better job of integrating its country-specific strategies into an overarching approach for accomplishing larger goals.

Egyptian media accusations regarding Israel’s role in Ethiopian Dam talks indicate Egyptian perspectives, and how they are utilized to fulfill the country's strategic aims.

Lethal targeting and other signs of escalation point to the necessity of a robust international maritime security force with a strong UN mandate.

There are more effective, less costly, and more sustainable ways to deter Tehran and shape its behavior than back-to-back deployments of carrier strike groups to the Gulf.

Ironically, the Syrian jihadist group now acts much like a typical Middle Eastern regime, from the way it mobilizes local support to the abuses it commits against those who oppose its rule.