Policy Analysis

Some Gulf governments have welcomed the paradigm-changing Israel-UAE agreement while others have not, and those who follow Abu Dhabi’s path will do so based on their own interests and timetables.

Iranian leadership has callously exploited hot button issues for decades, capitalizing on the plight of regional groups like Palestinians and Shia minorities in the Gulf while maintaining a particular international focus on African American issues in the United States. Iranian officials, most notably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, make relentless speeches

Statements and actions by Israel and the UAE show how much regional decisionmaking is still shaped by U.S. assurances that enable parties to calibrate their cost-benefit analyses—an approach that could serve as a template for potential future Israel-Gulf ties.

The visit and follow-on meetings present an opportunity to not only reaffirm the strategic partnership, but also move beyond outdated paradigms that view Iraq solely as an arena for countering terrorism and pushing back against Iran.

The ramifications of the application of the Caesar Civilian Protection Act, known as the Caesar Act, are becoming apparent in the wave of fear and anxiety that hit Syrian and Arab businessmen and traders who deal with the Syrian regime and who fear international sanctions that have begun to affect

Years of burgeoning trade and quiet U.S. diplomacy helped lay the groundwork for a move that is only partly focused on improving the bilateral relationship.

Carmel Dangor of the Israel Public Broadcasting Corporation published a leaked Israeli proposal for annexation in late June, which shows the difference between President Trump's vision and a subsequently developed Israeli map . This new Israeli map shows a very different concept than the Trump map. While Israel would get

Emirati leaders apparently understood that this move would preserve the two-state option and preempt Iran from exploiting the annexation issue—while also opening access to previously off-limits U.S. weaponry.

Arab countries that have official relations with Israel are more effective at advancing Palestinian interests, and now Abu Dhabi has joined their ranks.

Since Iraq’s first case of COVID-19 in late February, the Iraqi state has struggled to contend with stagnant economic growth, political unrest, and divided popular opinion as cases continue to rise through the summer. Despite early attempts to slow the spread of the virus, the rocky relationship between Iraq’s people

On July 30, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi announced that early elections in Iraq will take place on June 6, 2021. Following the announcement, various political parties unleashed a barrage of statements in Iraqi media, with some asking for even ‘earlier’ elections. This camp included the President, the Speaker, the UN

Although state officials and media have expressed somewhat nuanced views on the Beirut disaster and subsequent protests, most of their comments boil down to preventing deeper U.S. involvement and safeguarding Moscow’s interests in the current power structure.

Although containing or deterring minor powers can help shape the behavior of great powers, conflicts with these smaller foes have proliferated in the twenty-first century, tying down resources and attention needed elsewhere.

The current flare-up centers on differing interpretations of international law—a situation that should be employing lawyers but is instead deploying navies.

If the United States lets France take the lead, the Lebanese people will get more political paralysis, cosmetic reforms, and Hezbollah control of state institutions.

Saudi Sunnis and Shia largely agree on issues polled—except on Qassem Soleimani

Coming soon after Western naval redeployments in the Gulf and explosions at sensitive Iranian sites, the recent drills illustrate the regime’s eagerness to reassert its deterrence by showing off new weapons and capabilities.

Three regional health experts explain why countries that avoided the worst of the pandemic early on are now reeling from its spread.

Putin set a trap for Erdogan long ago, and because the Turkish leader woke up too late to his predicament, he now has little leverage in the unequal bilateral relationship.

Riyadh has now ticked the first two boxes on the enrichment checklist and might already be working on the others.