Syria

In October 2019, the U.S. troop withdrawal and subsequent Turkish invasion of northern Syria upended Kurdish plans in the region. But a year later, the major Syrian Kurdish rivals—the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC)—are coming together after a lengthy estrangement. This past June, representatives from the

Given their sharply diverging views on conflict zones, secularism, and regional spheres of influence, the two states are swiftly becoming NATO’s next diplomatic hotspot.

Recent developments in Syria indicate that the jihadi movement is splitting once again, as a prominent ideologue begins to form a third pole at odds with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Current events in Lebanon may seem remote compared to protests closer to Russia, but the situation in Beirut directly affects Moscow’s policy in Syria and its evolving status as a regional player.

Putin set a trap for Erdogan long ago, and because the Turkish leader woke up too late to his predicament, he now has little leverage in the unequal bilateral relationship.

Despite domestic challenges, major technical hurdles, and ongoing Israeli military interdiction, Iran still aims to transfer potent air defense systems to fellow ‘axis of resistance’ members and interconnect them.

The Kremlin’s interventions in Syria and elsewhere are just one part of its society-wide efforts to bolster Putin’s domestic standing via the security sphere.

Deeper Turkish engagement with the Syrian Kurds would be helpful, but any such talks need to be linked with ongoing efforts to contain the Islamic State and advance the UN’s broader Geneva process.

Although Moscow would face many challenges if it tries to establish permanent offensive and A2AD capabilities in Libya like it has in Syria, its covert actions thus far show a commitment to playing the long game against NATO in the East Mediterranean.