Proliferation

The Supreme Leader has remained noncommittal as usual while politicians argue about the approval process, but his hardline cadres are publicly insisting that the deal will threaten Iran's national security, damage its regional standing, and increase the risk of armed confrontation.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

While the agreement has a number of significant flaws, at least some can be rectified by various mitigation measures, provided the president is willing to commit to an effective implementation strategy.

A post-sanctions windfall would give Tehran ample capacity to rescue the Syrian regime, reshape Iraq's political environment, expand its terrorist proxy activities in various theaters, and otherwise amplify the effects of its destabilizing regional posture.

Tehran's longstanding arms trafficking and missile research efforts highlight the problem with wholesale removal of weapons restrictions.

The Supreme Leader's initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran's willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

Congressional rejection of the nuclear deal wouldn't be pretty, but a messy domestic political battle is a far cry from the president's warnings of potential war with Iran.

If the administration cannot convincingly describe a regional strategy into which the agreement fits, allies and skeptics are likely to assume an unspoken U.S. realignment or simple incoherence.

Nothing, including reluctantly accepting a bad agreement, is as dangerous as leaving open the question of how the United States would react if Iran approaches a nuclear weapons capability.