Iraqi Muqawama Shows Cohesion and Restraint During Israel-Iran War

Akram al-Kaabi, the leader of Harakat al-Nujaba, issued a direct threat against U.S. interests — including diplomats and ordinary citizens — in response to recent remarks made by U.S. President Donald Trump about Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In a statement posted online, al-Kaabi declared: “Perish in your disgrace and eat dirt, you criminal Trump! Who are you to threaten a pillar of the Islamic nation with death?! By God — and again, by God — if you lay a single finger on the leader of the umma, Imam Khamenei, then you and your allies and vile lackeys will be under our pursuit and fire across our entire Islamic region. … And not a single one of your soldiers or diplomats will be spared. In fact, anyone carrying your nationality in our region, and all your direct and indirect interests, will become legitimate targets for us." (figure 1). 

This appears to be a response to earlier comments by Trump suggesting that Khamenei could be targeted.

Before Kaabi, Abu Ali al-Askari — the security chief of Kataib Hezbollah (KH)— also reacted to Trump’s remarks, albeit in more restrained language. In a statement issued in both Farsi and Arabic, Askari wrote: “The foolish madman Trump has erred — both in his rhetoric and in his timing. He should have understood this before speaking about the stature of Imam Khamenei...".

Abu Ali al-Askari went on to reiterate a point made by Kataib Hezbollah’s secretary-general Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi on June 15, emphasizing that the Islamic Republic was fully capable of confronting Israel on its own. Askari warned that any potential involvement by the Iraqi muqawama would be contingent on direct U.S. participation in the war, declaring “We reaffirm that any American entry into this war will bring upon it unprecedented destruction and calamities”. Askari also implied that, in such a scenario, Kataib Hezbollah might choose to target U.S.-aligned Gulf states, saying: “Matters may escalate to the point that the thief Trump is deprived of the trillions he dreams of seizing from this region.” (Figure 2).

Curiously, in his statement, KH's Abu Hussein had called on “the Iraqi government and …the Coordination Framework to act to prevent the expansion of the war. This includes shutting down the embassy of the Great Evil (America) and expelling the American occupation forces from the country… (Figure 3). This was a notably toned-down message in an elections year, calling on Iraqi leaders to prevent the war from reaching Iraq—marking a shift from Kataib Hezbollah’s usual rhetoric, which often included threats and language suggesting Iraq could be drawn into the conflict.

Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, chose not to issue a statement himself, instead delegating the task to the militia’s head of security, Jawad al-Talibawi. Talibawi reiterated the group’s allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and warned “the United States of the consequences of joining its Zionist ally in the aggression against Islamic Iran" (Figure 4), though he did not specify what those consequences would be.

Protesting the U.S. embassy, Baghdad

On the other hand, the Shia Coordination Framework held its regular meeting with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in attendance. Following the meeting, the Framework issued a statement calling on Iraqi citizens “to take to the streets in demonstrations condemning the aggression and expressing support for the steadfastness and resilience of the Islamic Republic in confronting it.”

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This call coincided with a coordinated push by muqawama-affiliated social media channels to mobilize protests near the Mualaq Bridge in Baghdad, close to the U.S. Embassy, demanding the embassy’s closure. Sabereen News, a prominent Telegram channel with over 700,000 followers, was particularly active in promoting the demonstrations—especially among the muqawama’s support base and members of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Demonstrating its wide reach, a single Sabereen News post on June 15 urging all muqawama media and influencers to cover the protest had been viewed nearly 134,000 times by June 16 (Figure 5). Despite these efforts, only a few dozen people took part in the demonstrations—highlighting a prevailing mood in Iraq, even within muqawama circles, of reluctance to be drawn into the broader conflict.

What next for muqawama-U.S. tensions in Iraq?

After the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, the Iraqi muqawama also talked tough about evicting U.S. forces and striking U.S. bases if the U.S. joined the war. Then, in the aftermath of the October 17 Al-Ahli Hospital explosion, the Iraqi muqawama attacked U.S. bases anyway, as part of a "unity of fronts" action that had nothing to do with actual U.S. involvement. This time round, the Iraqi terrorist and militia groups are being more cautious and are probably grateful to be “held in reserve” for use if the U.S. becomes directly involved. The "unity of fronts" approach seems to be being saved for a last resort. 

The muqawama is showing cohesion as well as restraint. There is no evidence yet of Iran-backed militias in Iraq striking U.S. forces in Iraq, or using Iraqi territory to attack Israel. (Iranian drones intercepted in Iraq were moving through Iraqi airspace to Israel but appear to have passed too close to U.S. bases at Iraq’s al-Asad and Erbil Airport.) Smaller or more radical muqwawama groups like Harakat al-Nujaba or Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada have not unilaterally attacked U.S. sites, or attacked Israel from Iraq. This kind of cohesion is probably due to an early-war Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) directive that remains extant. If the U.S. becomes directly involved in the war, this same cohesion and apparent attention to IRGC-QF orders could be used to trigger muqawama strikes on U.S. facilities in Iraq, plus strikes launched from Iraq against U.S. sites in Syria, Jordan and maybe even the Gulf States.