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Brief Analysis
Part of a series: Militia Spotlight: Profiles
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Uli al-Baas is an Iran-linked propaganda and paramilitary formation, with stated ambitions to form a new anti-government insurgent and political structure in Syria.
Name: Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fi Surya-Uli al-Baas (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might)
Type of movement: Early stage fasail (armed group) in Syria. Full Spectrum of claimed kinetic attacks against Israeli forces and the Syrian interim government. Information operations (media activities and propaganda) against the interim government in Syria, and the governments of Turkey, the United States, and Israel. Operates as an Iran-linked propaganda and paramilitary formation, with stated ambitions to form a new political structure in Syria.
History and objectives:
- On December 17, 2024, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) called for “the establishment of a front to liberate southern Syria” from “Jewish aggression” and “work toward liberating all the occupied territories [in Syria]”. The SSNP operates in both Syria and Lebanon and maintains strong ties with the Assad's Baath Party as well as Lebanese Hezbollah.
- On January 9, 2025, Jabhat Tahrir al-Janoub (JTJ, or Southern Liberation Front) emerged as a “resistance group” originally focused on Israeli activity in Quneitra and Deraa, claiming to use military equipment left behind by the Assad regime. Two days later, JTJ rebranded, changing its name to Uli al-Baas (UAB, or Possessors of Might), and its logo from a map of Syria with the name "Southern Liberation Front” to one featuring a long arm holding an AK-47. This iconography is indicative of a Hezbollah-style logo and resistance narrative aligned with other Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed militias.
- In January 2025, UAB announced numerous operations against Israeli forces, including on January 13 where UAB claimed to have mobilized light armored vehicles and fighters to Quneitra, Suwayda, Deraa, Damascus, and the countryside surrounding the capital. Then, UAB alleged to have downed an Israeli drone in southern Syria on January 21. On January 31, UAB claimed an attack on Israeli forces in the village of Taranja in the northern countryside of Quneitra although they failed to provide evidence and later denied the incident on its official Telegram channel in February. UAB subsequently downplayed these claims and instead acknowledged that a preparatory phase was still underway.
In February 2025, the group reported the deaths of two senior members near Israeli lines and emphasized coordination with other pro-resistance factions, including Liwa Dir al-Sahel (Shield of the Coast Brigade) and Ghosts of the Spirit of Resistance Forces (Ashbah Rouh al-Muqawama). UAB then shared a video showing a blurred image of approximately twenty-five fighters. The men were depicted wearing a combination of paramilitary gear and civilian clothing, armed with personal weapons and a few rocket-propelled grenades (Figure 1).
Figure 1: UAB video featuring a blurred image of fighters, February 27, 2025. - In March 2025, UAB claimed its first joint kinetic operations with the so-called Syrian Popular Resistance-Dir al-Sahil Forces against the new government in Syria. On March 8, UAB released a statement claiming that “…Turkish, Zionist, American, and Arab occupiers — seek to eliminate the Syrian people and fragment them into easily conquerable pieces so their wealth can be plundered.” A later UAB statement on April 17 claimed the British and the Russians are among the “occupiers of Syria”.
- In an interview with Lebanese newspaper Annahar al-Arabi published on March 27, a source in the media wing of UAB emphasized that UAB "is not a transient movement, but rather a fully integrated organization," noting the existence of "specialized offices, including political, media, social, and military branches." The source also claimed that UAB’s relationship with the Syrian Popular Resistance-Dir al-Sahil Forces has ended, saying “There was coordination between the two sides in the past. But since the events on the coast on March 6 and the accusations leveled against the Front for being responsible, we have distanced ourselves from this faction.” He also claimed there is a lack of clear leadership direction with the Dir al-Sahil Forces.
- On May 5–7, 2025, UAB claimed to have held its “First General Extraordinary Conference” in Damascus, announcing a “Unified Military Council” and the launch of a campaign of “organized revolutionary escalation.”
On June 3, 2025, UAB posted its first low-quality video showing rocket launchers and claimed to have fired into Israeli-held Golan. This marked the group’s first partially verifiable military claim and the first cross-border strike since Assad’s fall in December 2024.On July 8, 2025, UAB released a statement formally confirmed the structure of the General Leadership and declared that it would lead all field, political, and media operations. The document also announced the full dissolution of the old political office and tasked Dr. Tariq Hamad (name unverified) with forming a new political bureau within 15 days which will work under the General Leadership.
Figure 2: UAB statement, July 8, 2025. - On July 6, UAB announced the death of its Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier General Muhammad Badran (Abu Ali). He was reportedly killed by Israeli forces while leading an operation in the town of Nawa in the Daraa countryside.
- On July 8, UAB announced a leadership restructuring. The group officially dissolved its political office and appointed Dr. Tariq Hammad to lead the formation of a new political team with revised responsibilities and an updated organizational structure (Figure 2).
- On July 15, UAB announced “The military leadership and all elements of the Syrian Popular Resistance pledge allegiance to the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Uli al-Baas – and officially announce joining the Front.” Adding “Death to the agents of the Zionists (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Members of the Syrian Resistance Front pledging allegiance to UAB, July 15, 2025. UAB now presents itself as an ideologically driven movement with aspirations to act across Syria through a centralized leadership and integrated “resistance” project.
Chain of command:
UAB appears to be ideologically and structurally aligned with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Its messaging is amplified by Farsi-language IRGC-affiliated Telegram channels such as “IRGC Cyber Corps,” and its logo resembles that of IRGC client militias like Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.
Leadership (as of July 21, 2025, but remain unverified):
- General Leader: Abu Jihad Ridha al-Husseini
- Deputy General Leader: Brig. Gen. Munthir Wannus (formerly Commander of Syrian Popular Resistance until July 8, 2025)
- Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. Ahmad Jad Allah
- Head of Political Office: Dr. Tariq Hamad
- Head of Security and Intelligence: Brig. Gen. Abu Mujahid
- Head of Mobilization & Organization: Colonel Hashim Abu Shuaib
- Head of Public Relations (prev Head of Central Media): Dr. Abbas al-Ahmad
- Military Spokesman: Abu al-Qasem
- Head of Women's Affairs: Batul Badr
- Head of Economic Affairs: Dr. Jubran Salim
- Head of Organizational Affairs: Ali al-Ashqar
- Head of Expatriates Unit (Russia): Malak al-Dhahir
- Poliburo Member: Dr. Mufid Shirbil
Affiliate relationships:
• In February 2025, UAB entered an alliance with:
- Liwa Dir al-Sahel (Shield of the Coast Brigade), led by Miqdad Fatiha (coastal region). This alliance faced some difficulties later, although there are some early indications that members of Liwa Dir al-Sahel joined UAB.
- Ghosts of the Spirit of Resistance Forces (Ashbah Rouh al-Muqawama), led by Dr. Abdulhamid al-Shamali (eastern Syria). These claims are unverified.
- Saraya al-Areen (Companies of the Den): Claimed paramilitary subunit led by Colonel Hashim Abu Shuaib, focused on southern Syria. According to UAB’s July 8 statement Hashim Abu Shuaib assumed the role of Head of Mobilization & Organization.
- Syrian Popular Resistance – claimed to have participated in the May 2025 conference.
Subordinate elements:
- Two Telegram channels: Primary outlet for propaganda, eulogies, political statements, and video content
- UAB also has some affiliated Telegram channels operating under other names such as al-Uqaab (Eagle)
An Expatriates Unit is claimed to exist to liaise with Assadists in Russia.
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