All Policy Analysis by Michael Eisenstadt

While the recent military strikes against its nuclear program may further incentivize Tehran to go for the bomb, they may also complicate such efforts and give Washington more leverage to dissuade it.

Fears of an “all-out” war with Iran have been greatly overstated, and they fail to account for the Islamic Republic’s overriding desire to avoid such an outcome and the diverse repertoire it has developed to prevent one.

U.S. and Israeli experts assess the quickly evolving situation as the IDF continues striking targets across the country, Tehran retaliates with missile salvos, and the international community mulls how best to contain the crisis.

A compilation of analyses on the military and nuclear impact of Israel’s initial strikes, Tehran’s response options, the Trump administration’s next steps, public reactions inside Iran, and more.

Washington Institute experts discuss what challenges must be addressed in negotiating a new nuclear deal or, failing that, planning a military campaign to degrade or destroy the program.

Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to consider how to define a successful strike, Iran’s potential responses, and whether a strategy of prevention can be sustained.

Despite questions about the utility of its huge missile arsenal—whose importance has only increased since the collapse of the “axis of resistance”—Iran will likely double down on this capability to ensure the viability of its military strategy.

The decision would require tradeoffs affecting the security, survivability, and military credibility of Tehran's nascent arsenal.

Although recent military setbacks have fueled Iranian talk about a possible nuclear breakout, uncertainty about the risks, costs, and utility of weaponization may give the United States leverage to ensure that Tehran continues to hedge.

Experience shows that a balanced strategy blending deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment can more effectively contain Iran.

The goal of destroying Hamas will require a prolonged military effort, but the longer the fighting drags on, the less likely Israel will be to retain the freedom of action needed to achieve its war aims.

A more rigorous understanding of how political and strategic cultures interact to affect the conduct of states could aid intelligence analysts and policymakers.

Policymakers need to stay focused on halting the regime’s fissile material buildup while undertaking a broader, longer-term effort to shape its assessment of the risks, costs, and utility of nuclear weapons.

The United States must underscore the risks that such action would incur and incentivize Tehran to rein in its proxies and partners.

Iran’s future military activities will likely be marked by greater continuity than change, but Supreme Leader Khamenei’s succession could presage more risk-acceptant behavior and a reconsideration of its nuclear hedging strategy.

Last week’s large, combined exercise was intended to assure friends and deter adversaries, but both goals will ultimately depend on fixing a flawed policy toward Iran.

Despite the obstacles to expanded cooperation, Russian aid could help Tehran promote repression at home and instability abroad, so the United States and its allies should seek to deter such collaboration wherever possible.

Three experts discuss how Washington might feasibly attempt to steer Tehran away from actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward.

Tehran may see the president’s attendance at the GCC+3 summit as a tempting opportunity to scuttle a U.S.-Gulf reset, perhaps by using a cyber or military provocation to humiliate the hosts and demonstrate America’s inability to protect them.