All Policy Analysis by Michael Eisenstadt

Last week’s large, combined exercise was intended to assure friends and deter adversaries, but both goals will ultimately depend on fixing a flawed policy toward Iran.

Despite the obstacles to expanded cooperation, Russian aid could help Tehran promote repression at home and instability abroad, so the United States and its allies should seek to deter such collaboration wherever possible.

Three experts discuss how Washington might feasibly attempt to steer Tehran away from actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward.

Tehran may see the president’s attendance at the GCC+3 summit as a tempting opportunity to scuttle a U.S.-Gulf reset, perhaps by using a cyber or military provocation to humiliate the hosts and demonstrate America’s inability to protect them.

There are more effective, less costly, and more sustainable ways to deter Tehran and shape its behavior than back-to-back deployments of carrier strike groups to the Gulf.

To meet future security challenges, the United States will need to reassess how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance in the region, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Addressing cultural factors and trends such as climate change will require solutions outside the traditional national security toolkit.

Experts discuss how the two allies can work more closely on everything from artificial intelligence to missile defense, ideally with help from emerging Arab partners.

The United States has repeatedly failed to understand the unique requirements of gray zone deterrence. A U.S. strategy would not only facilitate more successful diplomacy with Tehran but also enhance efforts to counter other actors such as China and Russia.

America’s failure to operate effectively in the gray zone against a third-tier power like Iran raises questions about its ability to counter much more potent actors like Russia and China.

Areas for especially timely U.S.-Israel cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas.

The main lesson of the nuclear fatwa is that Tehran’s national security decisions are guided by interests, not ideology, and that progress in negotiations is possible if framed in terms of "regime expediency."

Many of the administration’s early Middle East security efforts will boil down to crisis management, but new frameworks like the Abraham Accords may provide opportunities to address longer-term problems.

The new administration could face an Iranian military strike as early as inauguration day, along with multiple threats from the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and other actors down the road, all requiring clear demonstrations of U.S. resolve.

Three experts on Iranian politics and strategy assess the possibilities of last-minute dramatic developments between the two adversaries before the U.S. election.

Tehran’s entire modus operandi is designed to pressure Washington and its allies but avoid all-out conflict, and distorting this reality so close to a U.S. election will only hinder an effective policy response.

American security force assistance missions to Arab states have had only limited success, in large part because they do not train local units to fight in a manner well-suited to their cultural preferences and operational requirements.

Given the dilemmas involved in retaliating for recent acts of sabotage and the death of Qasem Soleimani, Iran will likely defer any substantial military action against U.S. targets until shortly before or after the November election.

For forty years, Iran has operated in the gray zone between war and peace. Military analyst Michael Eisenstadt explains an approach that could deter Iran while reducing risk of escalation.

Discussions about lifting the ban tend to focus on major weapons systems Tehran might acquire abroad, yet the most important long-term impact may be on its ability to upgrade existing capabilities and strengthen domestic arms production.