All Policy Analysis by Michael Eisenstadt

Washington Institute experts discuss what challenges must be addressed in negotiating a new nuclear deal or, failing that, planning a military campaign to degrade or destroy the program.

Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to consider how to define a successful strike, Iran’s potential responses, and whether a strategy of prevention can be sustained.

Despite questions about the utility of its huge missile arsenal—whose importance has only increased since the collapse of the “axis of resistance”—Iran will likely double down on this capability to ensure the viability of its military strategy.

The decision would require tradeoffs affecting the security, survivability, and military credibility of Tehran's nascent arsenal.

Although recent military setbacks have fueled Iranian talk about a possible nuclear breakout, uncertainty about the risks, costs, and utility of weaponization may give the United States leverage to ensure that Tehran continues to hedge.

Experience shows that a balanced strategy blending deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment can more effectively contain Iran.

The goal of destroying Hamas will require a prolonged military effort, but the longer the fighting drags on, the less likely Israel will be to retain the freedom of action needed to achieve its war aims.

A more rigorous understanding of how political and strategic cultures interact to affect the conduct of states could aid intelligence analysts and policymakers.

Policymakers need to stay focused on halting the regime’s fissile material buildup while undertaking a broader, longer-term effort to shape its assessment of the risks, costs, and utility of nuclear weapons.

The United States must underscore the risks that such action would incur and incentivize Tehran to rein in its proxies and partners.

Iran’s future military activities will likely be marked by greater continuity than change, but Supreme Leader Khamenei’s succession could presage more risk-acceptant behavior and a reconsideration of its nuclear hedging strategy.

Last week’s large, combined exercise was intended to assure friends and deter adversaries, but both goals will ultimately depend on fixing a flawed policy toward Iran.

Despite the obstacles to expanded cooperation, Russian aid could help Tehran promote repression at home and instability abroad, so the United States and its allies should seek to deter such collaboration wherever possible.

Three experts discuss how Washington might feasibly attempt to steer Tehran away from actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward.

Tehran may see the president’s attendance at the GCC+3 summit as a tempting opportunity to scuttle a U.S.-Gulf reset, perhaps by using a cyber or military provocation to humiliate the hosts and demonstrate America’s inability to protect them.

There are more effective, less costly, and more sustainable ways to deter Tehran and shape its behavior than back-to-back deployments of carrier strike groups to the Gulf.

To meet future security challenges, the United States will need to reassess how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance in the region, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Addressing cultural factors and trends such as climate change will require solutions outside the traditional national security toolkit.

Experts discuss how the two allies can work more closely on everything from artificial intelligence to missile defense, ideally with help from emerging Arab partners.

The United States has repeatedly failed to understand the unique requirements of gray zone deterrence. A U.S. strategy would not only facilitate more successful diplomacy with Tehran but also enhance efforts to counter other actors such as China and Russia.