All Policy Analysis by David Schenker

With prospects low for a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, the Lebanese group can decide how far this conflict escalates.

In addition to addressing each country’s concerns about border sovereignty, smuggling, and other irritants, Washington should emphasize the longer-term need to return to the peace treaty’s military limitations after the Gaza war.

As the war in Gaza seemingly winds down, the old rules no longer apply in the north.

Given the current lack of viable security alternatives on the Israel-Lebanon border, Washington may try to patch up UNIFIL’s many deficiencies—but it must do so with a clear understanding that the force has repeatedly failed its mission and squandered its credibility.

A former Israeli military planner joins three experts to discuss each side’s current calculus and the U.S. policy implications if they opt for war or a truce.

An American-led diplomatic initiative to separate their forces at the border appears to be falling short, and time is running out.

If Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel widens, the group could use its large missile and drone arsenal to attack Cyprus, the allied military presence based there, and a wide array of shipping and energy assets in the East Mediterranean.

The new emir’s suspension of parliament, followed by the appointment of a prime minister and crown prince, suggests a different direction for the oil-rich Gulf state.

Tehran and its proxies have been doing everything they can to destabilize Jordan during the Gaza war, from inciting protests and increasing drug and weapons smuggling to escalating armed threats from Iraq.

Their longstanding peace treaty may be safe, but the growing tensions threaten to unwind years of progress and distract Egypt from its most important goal—securing a ceasefire with Hamas.

The lesson from past deals involving Hezbollah is clear: the group will try to pocket any U.S. concessions on the presidency and other issues while simply jettisoning whatever border commitments it may make in return.

Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and other militias in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq have yielded visible benefits at times, but future operations may elicit a direct Iranian response.

From exploring land border talks to boosting Israel’s arsenal and recasting UNIFIL, Washington should do more to slow what may be an inevitable slide toward war on this front.

Most forces could likely be withdrawn or moved to the Kurdistan Region without harming U.S. interests—in fact, Washington might have more leverage in Baghdad without a troop presence.

​​​​​​​The administration has reversed its reversals on certain issues, signaling a more comprehensive approach toward the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Iran sanctions, and more.

Sisi’s red line against absorbing displaced Palestinians won’t budge, but Egypt can certainly host crucial initiatives that help them rebuild Gaza, train security personnel, desalinate water, and replace jobs Israel is no longer willing to provide.

The players have climbed another rung on the escalatory ladder in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Red Sea, exacerbating worries about a wider regional conflict and more serious economic effects.

A bad peace that does not address the wider issue of Hamas violence would only defer the war to a later date.

Cairo has understandable concerns about unsustainable refugee flows, Sinai terrorist threats, and longer-term Palestinian political aspirations, all of which need to be taken into account when pushing for humanitarian corridors into Gaza.

Beefing up U.S. naval deployments is not enough to boost deterrence—Washington must also respond decisively to proxy attacks on its forces and increase economic pressure on Tehran.