All Policy Analysis by David Schenker

Sudani did very well at the ballot box, but the peculiarities of Iraq’s long government formation process and the final distribution of parliamentary seats may leave the main Iran-backed coalition in the driver’s seat.

There will be no peace, sovereignty, or reconstruction for postwar Lebanon until more of the group’s weapons are confiscated, but Beirut appears increasingly unwilling to tackle that task outside the southern frontier zone.

Amman and Jerusalem need to worry about maintaining peace, not new arrangements in the West Bank.

Although regional peace agreements have survived the Gaza war and other recent crises, the increasingly explicit red lines being laid down by Arab capitals need to be taken seriously in Jerusalem and Washington.

The Gulf might be “the New Middle East,” but Washington should not forget that problems in “the Old Middle East” still set much of the regional agenda, raising the need for more consistent American engagement.

The government’s unprecedented decision to disarm Hezbollah is brave, but as U.S. officials have repeatedly discovered, continual pressure will be needed to ensure that Lebanon and Israel actually implement their obligations under the new plan.

Permanently enshrining Iran-backed terrorist groups inside the Iraqi state would be a massive blow to U.S. interests, so Washington’s reaction should be clear, proportionately harsh, and coordinated with other regional partners who have likewise been victimized by these groups.

After giving Lebanese officials a much-needed ultimatum for disarming Hezbollah and implementing financial reforms, Washington is now in danger of letting them once again punt these all-important tasks.

Despite the Iran-Israel showdown, if European and Arab states prove they are willing to do the diplomatic and financial heavy lifting required for progress with the Palestinians, the reticent Trump administration might be encouraged to engage.

A compilation of analyses on the military and nuclear impact of Israel’s initial strikes, Tehran’s response options, the Trump administration’s next steps, public reactions inside Iran, and more.

A former Trump administration official outlines the most important steps Washington can take to encourage Syria’s new government while systematically verifying that Damascus is living up to its commitments.

Four experts discuss what the Trump administration needs to do to follow through on the landmark talks with President Sharaa, from sorting through the complex web of sanctions to managing allied expectations and safely handing over the counter-IS mission.

In this third of several daily videos from Washington Institute scholars, David Schenker examines the implications of discussions at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Riyadh on the second day of President Trump's May 2025 trip to the Gulf region.

With the group and its Iranian patrons at their weakest point in decades, Beirut has a real opportunity to restore its sovereignty, but waiting for another futile “national dialogue” may close that window.

The agreement has withstood all challenges so far, thanks in large part to the mechanism that Israel and the United States set up to ensure Hezbollah's southern assets are addressed—one way or another.

Israel’s cross-border incursion is understandable but may have gone too far, raising the need for U.S. intercession on merging Syria’s disparate forces, easing sanctions, deconflicting with Turkey, and other urgent stabilization tasks.

What do Palestinians, Israelis, and external players see as the best option for Gaza and its people now that the first phase of the ceasefire is complete?

Despite well-founded worries about the rise of an Islamist government in Syria, the new rulers cannot be any worse than the previous regime—especially now that they are largely disarmed and disinclined to partner with U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia.

Baghdad has good reason to be concerned about the relationship’s trajectory, but that doesn’t mean Washington should proceed with troop withdrawals just yet.

Under heavy pressure from the Trump administration, the Arab states with the most to gain—and lose—in Gaza should be spending the next two weeks doing everything they can to reach consensus on bold, concrete counter-proposals.