Policy Analysis

Sanctioning Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood will likely have an impact on Burhan's approach to the group, but a true decoupling will likely require additional pressure given their political influence and role in the current conflict.

The diplomat Uri Lubrani was renowned for his persistent assertion that such an outcome in Iran was not only feasible but inevitable.

Amid major diplomatic milestones and major international security threats, three experts explore what it will take to achieve success on multiple negotiating tracks at once.

The economic, political, and diplomatic fallout of the Iran crisis is bending the kingdom in multiple directions, but Washington can do much to ease the domestic stress, avoid bilateral friction, and address Amman’s growing rift with Israel.

Cairo has put a premium on de-escalation in order to end the war as soon as possible and lessen the economic and energy shocks afterward, but this approach could backfire with its longtime benefactors in the Gulf states.

A regularly updated compendium of Beijing and Moscow’s reactions to the fighting in Iran, Lebanon, and beyond, including analysis of the similarities and differences in their respective diplomatic approaches to the crisis.

Rather than pushing for the unrealistic goal of reaching a comprehensive deal in two weeks, the Trump administration should take the necessarily more patient approach of working through America’s strong network of allies to strengthen its hand.

With Washington’s help, there is a path forward for Beirut and Jerusalem to agree on something that is more limited than a full ceasefire, and that enables them to launch negotiations to advance both the disarmament of Hezbollah and the achievement of bilateral peace.

The two governments have agreed to direct talks that could (and should) turn into a wider U.S.-brokered peace process, but only if officials are prepared to counter potential spoilers like Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri.

Human rights experts diagnose the current public mood in Iran and discuss how foreign governments can help counter the regime’s growing use of internet blackouts and other digital repression tools.

The military and diplomatic risks of reentering south Lebanon are weighty, but Israel can mitigate them by publicly clarifying its security objectives, pursuing a bilateral political horizon, focusing its military efforts, and (finally) holding officials in Beirut accountable.

As long as the Strait of Hormuz is fully reopened and enriched uranium is shipped out, ending the war quickly may be Washington’s best bet, since Tehran would be left to deal with dire domestic problems it has no answer for.

Although U.S. officials should keep pushing Baghdad to move against these groups, the Iran war has demonstrated the need to seek other avenues of pressure and recalibrate the bilateral relationship.

Beyond the widely discussed risk of energy shocks, the war also seems likely to spark a prolonged debt crisis, especially for the world’s poorest nations.

The debates sparked by Decree No. 39 raise questions about how the country will bridge the troubling gaps between official government discourse and victims’ rights.

As wider peace negotiations continue, U.S. officials should carefully consider the many moving parts needed for a proxies deal to succeed—and what Washington would do if Tehran starts flagrantly violating its terms.

The longstanding balance of Gulf security—in which states quietly maintained ties with Tehran while relying on Washington as the ultimate guarantor—is now under strain, making the future of their investment flows into the United States difficult to judge.

Three former U.S. policy practitioners experienced in negotiating with Iran discuss what kind of agreement is possible, what each side may require to make it happen, and how officials in Washington, Israel, the Gulf states, and Europe should address emerging differences in their objectives.

If the international community lags on the Sudan file or allows local forces to keep treating peace conferences as just another arena for their rivalries, the result will be even more space for bad actors to massacre civilians and loot the country’s wealth.

Even if Washington somehow convinces Iran to cut off support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, this would not eliminate the threat they pose.