Policy Analysis

The architecture behind Arab-Israel normalization has survived the war years, but expansion to other countries will require a credible embrace of diplomacy, along with regional collaboration to shape Gaza’s future.

Greater U.S. attention to oil and trade dynamics in Syria and Lebanon can help prevent adversarial states like Russia and illicit networks from exploiting weaknesses there.

A compilation of Washington Institute views on the fallout of the targeted strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, including what the United States and its partners can do to translate this latest Israeli military surprise into beneficial political achievements.

After seven months, the administration has shown that it is not isolationist, but it clearly prefers to rely much more heavily on regional partners than its predecessors did.

Washington should urgently heed Abu Dhabi’s warning—not only because it comes from such a close U.S.-Israeli partner, but also because of the major regional fallout it heralds if unilateral annexations proceed in the West Bank.

The Gulf might be “the New Middle East,” but Washington should not forget that problems in “the Old Middle East” still set much of the regional agenda, raising the need for more consistent American engagement.

The government and military’s decision to seize the group’s weapons is unprecedented and welcome—but it won’t mean anything without a clear and viable timeline for implementation, especially as political maneuvering for next year’s election begins.

Despite their confident saber rattling, both sides face real constraints that could impede their operational goals, and their actions increase the risks to maritime security, energy exports, and broader regional stability.

Iran’s leaders have several paths to restoring or reconfiguring their nuclear program—some more realistic or risky than others—so Washington should focus on shaping which route they choose rather than discounting the possibility altogether.

Genocide scholars lent their reputation to an indictment of Israel that was less a serious inquiry than a parade of previously debunked claims and disgraced “experts.”

Actually enforcing them will require hard work by Western diplomats and experts in the face of opposition from Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow.

Although Tunisia's president maintains an illusion of full control, labor unrest and voter apathy are mounting, making him more dependent on a small and potentially fragile circle of internal security institutions.

President Aoun has promised Washington that he will begin confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons soon, but he is delivering a different message to the group and its political allies.

The government’s unprecedented decision to disarm Hezbollah is brave, but as U.S. officials have repeatedly discovered, continual pressure will be needed to ensure that Lebanon and Israel actually implement their obligations under the new plan.

Any proposal for granting citizenship to such fighters must be careful, clear, and firm in how it addresses various complexities, including international concerns about external security threats, Syria’s stability, and the post-Assad accountability process.

Reimposing old sanctions may not have much economic impact if China sidesteps them, but Washington could still use the mechanism to pressure Iran on returning to negotiations.

Tehran’s recruitment of Israelis for military surveillance, sabotage, assassination plots, and other operations is on the rise, showing how the shadow war between the two adversaries continues to evolve even after their recent hot war.

Existing programs are plagued by a broken tenure system, suspect foreign donors, Hamas apologists, and other ailments, but new programs at up-and-coming universities can help the field return to practical, non-ideological scholarship and respect for civil discourse.

Given their long history of terrorist plots in the West, Iranian agents and proxies could pursue multiple options for hitting back at America after the June war.

Overhauled Turkish and Emirati training programs for the Somali army and renewed funding for the African Union mission could provide the boost that Mogadishu needs, and Washington should push for both.