All Policy Analysis by Crispin Smith

In its first statement since October, a notorious Kataib Hezbollah Telegram account offered a deeper dive into how the "resistance" views a range of new developments in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

Abu Hussein has asked the group's fighters to keep showing restraint, seemingly reinforcing Iran's preference for calm as nuclear talks with Washington proceed.

The FBI deposition on Steven Troell’s killers and other evidence provides a closer look inside cross-militia Iraq terrorist cells operated by Iran's Qods Force and potentially linked to the facade brand Ashab al-Kahf.

A group with a Saudi-linked name has claimed six attacks on Israel, but they were probably launched from Iraq using Kataib Hezbollah and/or Houthi drone teams.

Saraya Awliya al-Dam launched a Shahed drone from a small boat in an apparent effort to draw attention by demonstrating a rudimentary new capability.

The self-styled Islamic Resistance in Iraq has greatly increased its attack claims and is starting to cause fatalities in Israel, inviting a military response.

The strikes are not yet numerous enough to form a definitive pattern, but they probably reflect deep militia divisions over whether to renew anti-coalition attacks in earnest amid the Gaza war.

Since 2022, the court has become a channel for Iran-backed militias and terrorist groups to secure “made to order” legal rulings that can have decisive political “lawfare” effects in their favor.

Iran-backed groups have adopted tight message discipline so far, not claiming either of the attacks in order to avoid U.S. retaliation while simultaneously warning Prime Minister Sudani to keep pushing for U.S. withdrawal.

A comprehensive study of the various institutional, financial, and military levers that have enabled Iran’s “resistance” camp to take over another country even under the international community’s watchful eye.

Iraqi "resistance" elements are becoming more bellicose in their rhetoric against the American presence, signaling a new level of escalation against U.S. troops as part of their efforts to support Hamas in the Gaza war.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and their facade group partners may soon step up their attacks amid the Hamas-Israel war, albeit within limits set by Iran.

The Iraqi "resistance" is using language that previously presaged attacks on U.S. targets, whether sincerely or as a supportive bluff amid the latest Hamas-Israel crisis.

By establishing this Iraqi version of an Iranian IRGC conglomerate, militias aim to quickly dominate the country's growing economy.

After falling under the control of “resistance”-linked board members, this key Iraqi media institution began a widespread crackdown on freedom of expression. Its head commissioner is a member of U.S.-designated terrorist group Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Liwa al-Ghaliboun is an Iraqi cell that is directed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and has undertaken proxy attacks on U.S. personnel in Syria.

Top "resistance" groups sought to avoid embarrassing the Sudani government, but at least one propaganda channel gave away Iraqi involvement.

Similar to Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Iraqi "resistance" groups have long sought a company with preferential access to lucrative state contracts, and the Sudani government is finally providing them after years of opposition—on the Saudi border no less.

The slow-rolling regime change focused on capturing U.S.-supported institutions and turning them against U.S. interests, highlighting the threat that motivated, well-funded groups pose to developing democracies.

Officials appear to be cracking down on freedom of speech and alternative lifestyles opposed by the self-styled militia "resistance."