All Policy Analysis by Crispin Smith

By establishing this Iraqi version of an Iranian IRGC conglomerate, militias aim to quickly dominate the country's growing economy.

After falling under the control of “resistance”-linked board members, this key Iraqi media institution began a widespread crackdown on freedom of expression.

Liwa al-Ghaliboun is an Iraqi cell that is directed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and has undertaken proxy attacks on U.S. personnel in Syria.

Top "resistance" groups sought to avoid embarrassing the Sudani government, but at least one propaganda channel gave away Iraqi involvement.

Similar to Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Iraqi "resistance" groups have long sought a company with preferential access to lucrative state contracts, and the Sudani government is finally providing them after years of opposition—on the Saudi border no less.

The slow-rolling regime change focused on capturing U.S.-supported institutions and turning them against U.S. interests, highlighting the threat that motivated, well-funded groups pose to developing democracies.

Officials appear to be cracking down on freedom of speech and alternative lifestyles opposed by the self-styled militia "resistance."

With probable IRGC-QF acquiescence, a militia facade group struck U.S. targets in Syria to register its defiance against a possible extension of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Pro-militia parliamentarians and journalists have become increasingly open about what they expect the Sudani government's role to be: a cover for the muqawama.

Al-Warithuun is a "resistance" brand with a recurring connection to kinetic operations that are directed by Iran's Qods Force but intended to be deniable.

Sabereen News appears to have added cyberattacks to its normal activities of spreading militia propaganda and disinformation, claiming operations against Israeli, Turkish, and Saudi targets.

Sabereen News has seemingly broadened its capabilities to include simple hacking tactics like DDoS attacks, and it might quickly proceed to more complex exploits.

The network was closed down almost entirely from March 28 to April 8, albeit with one apparent effort by rebellious members to refuse the suspension and blame Iran.

The network's hiatus may have been ordered in response to its recent lean toward Russia, or perhaps its role in enabling a controversial arson attack on a political office.

Militia groups appear to be increasingly exercising their different kinetic capabilities in Iraq and Syria, but why now?

Alongside an apparent technical uplift, the militia network's coverage of the crisis has gone far beyond that of even the most pro-Russian outlets in Iraq.

The unmasking of Abu Hussein and his brothers puts the deposed Kataib Hezbollah official on the receiving end of his favorite tactic: leaking the faces and names of rivals.

With probable links to Kataib Hezbollah, this minor facade group claimed a major rocket attack on al-Asad Air Base, but mainly limits itself to claimed bombings against U.S. supply convoys.

A minor sub-group took credit for recent airport strikes, indicating a return to the "facade" strategy and a role for AAH in the latest escalation.

The process of assuaging the militia support base was carefully stage-managed in the first week of the new year, with Iran and Nujaba setting the ground rules.