All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

Two of Prime Minister Sudani's partners in government—the terrorist groups Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq—have stepped up their efforts to bar Syria's new president from a Baghdad summit.

Terrorist organizations are exploiting Iraq’s energy sector to the tune of billions of dollars per year, raising the need for more intensive efforts to trace how revenues are routed into oil “voucher” programs and other diversion schemes.

In its first statement since October, a notorious Kataib Hezbollah Telegram account offered a deeper dive into how the "resistance" views a range of new developments in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

The Trump administration needs to quietly but firmly signal Baghdad that enshrining the militia umbrella group as a de facto “Iraqi IRGC” would pose an unacceptable threat to U.S. interests.

Experts discuss how the new campaign differs from previous U.S. strikes in Yemen, what targets are being hit, and whether it can resolve the threat without broader American policy efforts.

The Trump administration should not be duped by the supposed “reforms” that militia leaders are considering in parliament, which threaten to turn the PMF into another Iranian “Revolutionary Guard” and keep U.S.-designated terrorists in key posts.

Iraqi militias and politicians alike have been walking on eggshells with Washington, suggesting that the “axis of resistance” is vulnerable to tough diplomatic and intelligence action.

Uli al-Baas certainly looks and feels like an Iran-supported militia info-ops platform, designed to give the impression (possibly accurate) that a pantheon of armed groups are activating to fight Israel and the new Syrian government.

By letting previous waivers expire, the United States can help Baghdad establish other suppliers and stand on its own feet for the first time.

Most of the top militia leaders appeared too cowed to show up, but a wide assortment of senior Iraqi "resistance" and political figures did attend, including potential future candidates for prime minister.

The cessation of Houthi-Iraqi joint strikes on Israel does not mean that Houthi money-movers and trainers have gone home; more likely, they are now a permanent feature of Iraq and merit close scrutiny from counterterrorism analysts.

The FBI deposition on Steven Troell’s killers and other evidence provides a closer look inside cross-militia Iraq terrorist cells operated by Iran's Qods Force and potentially linked to the facade brand Ashab al-Kahf.

New data shows that Iran-backed Afghan and Pakistani terrorists are arriving at a broadening range of Iraqi military bases.

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Baghdad has provided shelter and material support to members of two U.S.-designated Afghan and Pakistani groups run by the Iranian military.

The regime wants Baghdad to hand over the officer who orchestrated the 2022 murder of U.S. citizen Stephen Troell—not the first time it has leveraged Iraqi militia factions to seek his release.

In the shadow of Trump's imminent inauguration, Iran-backed terrorist groups were cautious in how they commemorated the anniversary of the January 2020 killings.

An effective response to the group's persistent aggression should include strengthening the United Nations verification and inspection mechanism, preparing sanctions against actors who violate UN resolutions, and taking steps to interdict arms transfers.

The leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq has been abroad for weeks, and his movements (and those of his deputies back home) are worth watching closely.

One of Iran's most trusted lieutenants in the Iraqi militia scene is loudly rattling his saber against the U.S. presence in the Middle East.

Tehran’s past efforts to reconstitute the group have passed through more difficult environments than post-Assad Syria, but an economical U.S.-led effort can complicate future smuggling efforts and further other counterterrorism goals in the process.