Terrorist Wing of the Iraqi Government Opposes Sharaa Visit

As Iraq’s election season begins, several self-styled muqawama (resistance) media outlets have intensified their campaign against the invitation extended by the Iraqi government to Syrian president Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) to attend the May 17 Arab League summit in Baghdad. (For an earlier look at opposition to the visit, see our April 23, 2025 piece.)

KH and Yousif al-Kilabi oppose Sharaa’s visit

The Iraqi MPs lining up to oppose the visit are almost identical to the cast of characters that attended Lebanese Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah's formal funeral in February 2025. On May 11, Kataib Hezbollah-linked MP Mustafa Sanad (Figure 1) was among the most vocal opponents of the invitation. He has tried to organize protests in Basra and Baghdad. This call to protest prompted a swift response from the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which warned that any such protest between May 11 and May 20 would be illegal. (Figure 2). Sanad’s post was widely shared across muqawama social media, and his follow-up comment directly challenged the Ministry, stating: “I will protest. If you have the guts, arrest me.” Sanad is a protégé of Adel Abdal-Mahdi, a key figure in the latter’s officer when, as premier, Abdal-Mahdi presided over Iraq’s first muqawama-run government (in 2018-2020), including the 2019 massacres of civilian protestors during the Tishreen uprising. As our March 28, 2025 piece noted, Abdal-Mahdi is now a political godfather to Iran-backed militants in Iraq.

Another pro-muqawama MP Yousif al-Kilabi also responded to the MOI’s statement with a post on X, asserting: “In the event of Al-Jolani's presence, we will not hesitate to use all peaceful means to express our unequivocal rejection of his presence. As for the government and the presidency of the republic, if they breach the law, we will hold them accountable. #BreakingTheOath” (Figure 3). Additionally, the head of Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement in parliament, Saud al-Saadi, sent a parliamentary inquiry to the Ministry of Interior, requesting the legal basis for banning protests during the summit (Figure 4). Saud al-Saadi is notorious for his role in undermining Iraq's maritime agreement with Kuwait. 

Badr versus Asaib

In contrast, the Badr Organization continues to back Sudani and try to draw criticism off of him. On April 30, Badr Organization politician Udai al-Khadran told Shafaq News that Prime Minister Sudani had been authorized by the Coordination Framework to decide on Ahmed al-Sharaa’s participation in the summit. (Khadran was the mayor of Khalis, Badr leader Hadi al-Ameri’s home district and a Badr stronghold.) On May 4, Hadi Al-Ameri also backed up Sudani on Al-Janub TV, directing blame on the unnamed Arab states that “recognized Al-Jolani … as a head of a state,” leaving Iraq unable to deny him an invite based on Arab League protocol. (Figure 4).

Reflecting the poor pre-electoral relations between Badr and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), MP Udai Awad of the U.S.-designated terrorist group AAH told Al-Rabia TV on May 7 that Hadi al-Ameri was “singing outside the flock” and denied the Coordination Framework had given Sudani any backing to invite Jolani. This is one of many attacks AAH has made on Sudani and the Sharaa visit in the last month. 

PMF downplays any tension over posters

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) also seemed to be intent on downplaying the tension over the Arab League summit. On May 11, several social media platforms circulated videos and images showing the removal of posters and billboards of muqawama fighters and other prominent resistance figures from Baghdad. One widely shared video included interviews with individuals near the removed posters, with one person accusing Baghdad municipality of 

clearing the images in preparation for the Arab Summit. This is happening because Iraq's government knows that it will gravely offend and alarm Gulf Arab leaders if they are forced to drive past massive billboards bearing the images of terrorists who have regularly endorsed (and carried out) attacks on the Gulf States in recent years. Yet the Media Directorate of the PMF released a statement on X on 12 May, denying the allegations, calling them “misinformation.” (Figure 5).

Key Findings

Moments like these are always instructive concerning fracture lines inside the muqawama. The inherent tension between an Iraqi state (led by a putative chief executive, Sudani) and the terrorist militia-led Coordination Framework (who put Sudani in place as their "general manager") is exposed at such times. Yet the coming elections on November 11, 2025 add another layer: Sudani's current backers for reappointment (Hadi al-Ameri and the PMF secretary general Falih al-Fayyadh) see the need to protect Sudani as a prime ministerial candidate and a statesman. Fayyadh's nominal deputy in the PMF, U.S.-designated terrorist and Kataib Hezbollah member Abu Fadak (seen with Sanad in Figure 1) is staying on the sidelines, as is Sudani's election rival, Nouri al-Maliki. 

Other parts of Kataib Hezbollah and all of Asaib Ahl al-Haq are coming after Sudani for different reasons - Kataib because they genuinely oppose Jolani's visit, and Asaib because they are trying to damage Sudani. So-called "independent" MPs like Yousif al-Kilabi are pulling free of their original benefactors (in his case, Badr) and making their own calculations ahead of elections, seemingly not with Sudani for now. And neither the militias' political godfather Adel Abdal-Mahdi nor the Iranians themselves are being called upon to play peacemaker in such dramas, probably because there is still a lot of time to kiss and make up before elections, and because Iran is not keen to see Sharaa in Baghdad either.