Militias Strain Credibility by Denying Involvement in Kurdistan Drone Attacks
Jul 25, 2025
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Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq are improbably trying to distance from anti-Kurdistan drone attacks, including multiple strikes on US oil investors.
In recent weeks, a series of drone attacks have targeted multiple security, oilfield and power facilities in Iraqi Kurdistan, leading to the suspension of operations at several sites. In at least ten of the cases, the drones used to attack these sites were Iran-provided Shahed-101 explosive drones of the exact same kind that Iran-backed terrorist groups in Iraq (Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba) have used on hundreds of occasions since 2023. The attribution of the attacks to these groups was apparently reinforced by an written statement posted on July 5 by Abu Ali al-Askari, the security chief of Kataib Hezbollah, who is possibly an online persona that changes hands but which has been linked most consistently to KH member of parliament Hussein Moanes. Although the Abu Ali message did not directly reference the oil sector, al-Askari accused the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Peshmerga forces of maintaining ties with Israel (Figure 1).
Muqawama leaders protest too much
Iran-backed militias have since been vocal in denying any involvement in the recent attacks. On July 20, the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (the militia tansiqiya) broke its long silence—issuing its first statement in over a year—to publicly distance the militias from the drone strikes. This old umbrella name, the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, had largely been replaced by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) label after October 7, 2023. The return of the tansiqiya label may indicate a shift in the militias’ posture after the Israel-Iran 12-day war, back to a more internal focus. The statement reads:
What the Kurdistan Region has witnessed in terms of bombing operations targeting its oil fields is nothing but a settling of scores between oil companies and the regional government, and not a cross border conflict. The Islamic Resistance, in all its formations, has always distanced itself from any operations that harm the interests of the people or the security forces, whether in the north or south of the country [while protecting] the national interest remains its ultimate goal (Figure 2).
On the same day, the U.S. designated terrorist and human rights abuser Qais al-Khazali—the leader of terrorist group Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)—reiterated this stance during a Muharram sermon, implicitly accusing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of orchestrating the attacks on oil infrastructure.
Recently, there have been numerous attacks targeting oil wells, oil fields, oil companies, and refineries… We condemn and reject these actions… If you want to know who is responsible, ask: who benefits from this act?... It should be noted that the Iraqi government… has done all it can to resolve the issue with the Kurdistan Region, urging the Region to hand over oil to the federal government… This came at a critical moment. Now, [after the attacks] the Kurdistan Regional Government can say: ‘We don’t have the oil to pay salaries.’ The oil isn’t available because the oil companies have halted operations… So, who benefits from this? (Figure 3).
To demonstrate their commitment to stopping these attacks, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) deployed Ansar al-Marjaiya—the PMF’s 44th Brigade, known for its lack of ties to Iran—in a joint operation with units from the Iraqi security forces to search areas in Nineveh Governorate “after receiving information indicating that the drones were launched from Jazirat al-Hadhar"(Figure 4). (These so-called Atabat (shrine) PMF forces might be better-employed policing the Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu areas, where most drone attacks seem to have originated.)
Analysis
Needless to say, militia denials of involvement in the drone strikes on Kurdistan security and energy sites should be treated with deep skepticism. Prior to the beginning of the drone strikes on Kurdistan security forces, on June 12 and June 17, multiple threatening statements were released by Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), one of the most prolific terrorists groups involved in historic attacks on the Kurdistan Region. On June 21 a senior KSS security official was killed by Israel on the Iran-Iraq border. On July 2, 2025, the former head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Major General Rahim Safavi, told AAH’s Al-Ahad TV channel: “We warn northern Iraq [KRG] against any American threats originating from its territory.” All of the identified drone carcasses found at impact points were either Iran-provided Shahed-101 drones (nine of ten) or, in one case, an Iran-provided KAS-04 drone. The militia allegation that Kurdistan is attacking its own energy sites is an indication that KH and AAH have a very low estimation of their supporters' ability to think critically.
Given that the evidence so overwhelmingly points at the Iran-backed terrorist militias embedded within the Mohammed Shia al-Sudani government and the PMF, why are KH and AAH terrorist leaders denying their involvement? They may fear U.S. retribution, via kinetic strikes and sanctions on militia and Iranian interests. They may also dislike the optics created: of militias attacking the oil and gas resources of Iraq, outside the law, a perfect example to justify a future crackdown on “arms outside the state” and prevention of the PMF becoming a permanent security agency, both hot issues in pre-election Iraq.
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