
Asaib Ahl al-Haq Accuses Falih al-Fayyadh of Turkish Collusion

Asaib Ahl al-Haq continues to battle with Falih al-Fayyadh, this time highlighting the latter's alleged ties to Turkey as a means to undermine the Popular Mobilization Forces secretary-general
A political dispute between Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh—originally centered on the proposed PMF Service and Retirement Law—has escalated into a more serious confrontation. AAH has launched a campaign accusing Fayyadh of advancing Turkish interests, signaling a deepening rift within the Coordination Framework as it prepares for the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11, 2025.
The first public salvo came on March 31, when AAH Secretary General Qais al-Khazali used his Eid al-Fitr speech to allege that “[t]here are militias that include thousands of fighters who have been trained, financed and led 100% by Turkey…They are Iraqis from the provinces of Nineveh and Kirkuk and sent to Turkey, where they were trained… Some of them still receive salaries from Turkey. Their official name is the Nineveh Guard Forces and the Kirkuk Shield Forces. A section of them was incorporated into the Popular Mobilization Forces... and they receive salaries under the name of the PMF, specifically in the 59th Brigade in Nineveh. I call for an investigation [into this matter]” (Figure 1).
Khazali’s accusations set the stage for the following media and political attacks against Fayyadh. On April 15, AAH’s al-Ahad TV hosted Major General Abdal Karim Khalaf, former spokesman for Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under Prime Minister Adel Abdal Mahdi and a figure now closely aligned with AAH. Khalaf said, "Falih Al-Fayyad traveled in a VIP jet on three secret visits to Turkey at one of their military bases. He conducted those visits not just to incorporate those forces [Nineveh Guards and Kirkuk Shield into the PMF], but to explain to the Turks that the PMF are not against Turkey" (Figure 2).
This is an unprecedented direct attack against Fayyadh, accusing him of being an agent of Turkey. AAH has relied on a former high-ranking official to publicize these accusations, likely in an effort to lend credibility to the claims and further undermine Fayyadh’s reputation.
The next day, on April 16, al-Ahad TV published purported internal documents attributed to the Intelligence and Information Department of the PMF’s General Directorate of Information. The documents alleged that the Nineveh Guards’ numbers totaled 2,119 personnel, with 750 allegedly receiving salaries from Turkey and stationed at Zlikan base, while 1,519 operated under the PMF’s 59th Brigade (a breakdown that, notably, does not add up, see Figure 3). These documents also provided detailed breakdowns of the group's leadership, deployment, portraying the Nineveh Guards as effectively functioning as Turkish proxies (Figure 4). (Zilkan base has been attacked on numerous occasions by muqawama rockets and drones.)
The accusations were soon echoed by political figures, including Basra MP Alla Sabah al-Haidari—closely aligned with the muqawama factions—who also appeared on al-Ahad TV to praise Khazali for bringing what he described as a major security threat to light. He claimed that the Nineveh Guards and Kirkuk Shield were "Turkish-made" and accused President Erdogan of seeking a presence in Iraq. Haidari added that Iraqi intelligence agencies had confirmed these movements after Khazali brought them to public attention, warning the people of Mosul and Kirkuk to "be prepared to fight" those forces, as they could "ravage the cities" at any moment (Figure 5).
Despite sustained efforts, Asaib Ahl al-Haq has so far failed to remove Falih al-Fayyadh, largely due to his backing from Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and continued support from Iran. Frustrated by this political deadlock and the withdrawal of the PMF Service and Retirement Law, AAH has escalated its campaign to an unprecedented level—openly accusing Fayyadh of colluding with Turkey and mobilizing media and political allies to amplify the charges. This marks a notable shift in AAH’s posture: it is no longer content with behind-the-scenes maneuvering and appears increasingly willing to go head-to-head with its Shia rivals within the Coordination Framework. With parliamentary elections looming in November 2025, the confrontation has become a clear sign that intra-Shia power struggles are intensifying—and spilling further into the open.