Policy Analysis

International actors, while expressing confidence in the country’s political progress, struggled to adapt to economic resistance from the national labor union, the destabilizing effects of terrorism, and interference from outside actors.

Iraqi sales to Asian markets rely heavily on the strait, and efforts to establish viable alternative routes would have to overcome considerable logistical challenges—not to mention Baghdad’s bad track record with pipelines.

The United States eased its fertilizer restrictions on the kingdom to manage a supply emergency, but Morocco could also become a key source of purified phosphoric acid—a crucial product tied to growing competition with China over battery production, supply chain integrity, and access to critical minerals.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

The author’s return to a post-Assad Syria revealed grounds for hope—but also sobering reminders of how far the country has to go in shoring up its economy, governance, and internal security.

The success of his latest trip should be measured by whether he can expedite preparations for practical issues like policing and weapons collection so that the Gaza transition plan remains viable after Israel’s election.

The more the LAF demonstrates it can enforce state authority in disarming Hezbollah, the less Israel will be compelled to continue its operations, and the more it will be inclined to gradually withdraw—though neither side can succeed without sustained U.S. leadership, a clear verification mechanism, and appropriate limits on international involvement.

The breakdown in Israeli relations with Turkey did not eliminate Jerusalem’s obstacle to recognizing the Armenian genocide; that hesitation has merely been shifted to Azerbaijan.

Libyans are increasingly questioning where governance reforms fit into the agendas of Libyan elites' engagement with the parallel UNSMIL 2025 roadmap and Boulos initiative.

Despite the group’s assent, major gaps remain with Israel over sequencing, disarmament, and oversight, casting doubt on the agreement’s feasibility.

The June MOU and the 2013 JPOA are not perfect analogues, but the deliberately limited terms and careful specificity of the latter agreement hold prudent lessons for both Washington and Tehran as they contemplate a potential new round of direct negotiations.

Despite recent high-profile arrests, transatlantic authorities won’t be able to meet their longer-term goals of stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza unless they take broader action against still-rampant Hamas fundraising.

Washington and Beirut have made significant strides toward curtailing Hezbollah’s military arsenal, but dismantling the group’s “aspiring martyr” pipeline is no less important.

Any postwar system must preserve the “transit passage” regime, enable ships to safely resume use of the original IMO route, and reject mandatory fees, veto rights, or other Iranian tactics for exerting permanent control over one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

The Gulf needs a joint front on deterrence, engagement, and freedom of navigation.

Amid mounting economic and security pressures in the West Bank, only a U.S.-led mechanism can credibly determine Palestinian compliance with the Taylor Force Act and help promote wider stability.

A determination that the Sudanese government used chemical weapons likely will not alter the military balance, but it does create a record that activists, human rights advocates, and any future civilian government can ultimately draw upon in pursuing accountability.

As the dust settles from new attacks in both countries, Baghdad will need U.S. support to make progress against Iran-backed militias while assuaging Riyadh’s security concerns.

Given the country’s difficult experience during the Iran war, Washington should offer sustained political attention, practical assistance, and an expanded vision for the partnership’s future.

While it no longer enjoys primacy in Damascus, the Kremlin has proven itself able to adapt to the new reality, and Washington must play the long game in response.