Policy Analysis

Only a comprehensive initiative aimed at curbing Hezbollah’s influence both within Lebanon and in the region stands a chance of delivering peace for the long term.

The Kataib Hezbollah leader killed on February 7 in Baghdad was (until now) a living nexus of Kataib Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the facade group Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq.

Since three Americans were killed, the self-styled "resistance" has been almost inactive except for a spate of fake, foiled, and disavowed attacks, pointing to an order from Iran to calm things down.

Three experts address the thorny strategic questions arising from attacks on global shipping by the Yemen-based group.

The relationship between Human Rights Watch and Moroccan state institutions has been notably tense recently, likely due to HRW’s assessments of the human rights situation in Morocco, which do not necessarily align with those of the government.

Greater decisiveness would have shortened the conflict, lessened the toll on global maritime trade, and reassured U.S. partners in the region and beyond.

For opportunity to emerge from tragedy, two bridges must be built: one leading from the current situation to the “day after” the war, and a second creating a viable path to a Palestinian state.

The decision could lead to further spending reductions in the kingdom.

The brigade belongs to the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces and is a core member of Kataib Hezbollah’s cluster of militias that facilitate anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq’s Anbar province, eastern Syria, and Jordan.

After Kataib Hezbollah announced it was suspending attacks on U.S. forces, the self-styled “resistance” became a hot mess of recriminations.

In Gaza, Lebanon, and beyond, Paris continues to favor multilateral approaches that incorporate key regional partners, though it understands Washington’s paramount role in achieving regional stability.

The more the Islamic Republic and its proxy groups escalate with the United States and Israel, the greater the risks for a misstep.

Washington’s ever-narrowing Iraq policy has left it with unpalatable choices, but muddling through is a better short-term option than allowing the relationship to rupture.

While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians.

With regard to Sudani’s visit to America, we need to see what the Iraqi PM can achieve before confirming this important invitation. Sudani can be a real prime minister of a real sovereign state if he wants to be, but that will require taking risk.

The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities.

Tehran may simply revive the group or replace it with another terrorist proxy, so Washington and its partners will need to disrupt the flow of Iranian arms and informal financial support to extremist elements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Given the ways in which Iranian influence has grown elsewhere in the region, there are fears that the Sudanese army, with its Islamist orientation, will morph into a militia group similar to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, ultimately exerting Iran’s will in exchange for funding and military support.

The regime has been able to drive economic growth, stifle mass protests, and expand its infiltration of neighboring countries, but lingering existential concerns could spur it toward even bolder courses of action—including potential nuclear breakout.

Abu Hussein has unveiled a dramatic gambit to sidestep Washington's threatened response to the killing of three U.S. soldiers.