All Policy Analysis by Andrew J. Tabler

Two years into Operation Inherent Resolve, where does the U.S. campaign to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State stand?

If Russia does want to limit its involvement in Syria, the threat of limited strikes should persuade it to make the Syrian leader behave.

The agreement's currently proposed terms have far less chance of stemming the international terrorist threat, helping the Syrian people, or turning the cessation of hostilities into a viable ceasefire.

If Ankara wants to intervene against the Islamic State in Syria, block Kurdish advances, and defeat the PKK at home, it may decide to do whatever is necessary to placate Moscow, perhaps even cutting off support for certain anti-Assad rebel groups.

Helping Russia target the jihadist group will only benefit the Assad regime unless Washington ensures that such efforts are carefully targeted, strictly conditioned, and accompanied by additional reinforcement of the moderate opposition.

Russia and Syria's dormant ties with the group have been reawakened by the civil war, raising the prospect of dangerous weapons proliferation and potential escalation into direct conflict with Turkey.

The recent Russian "withdrawal" from Syria reflects not a parting of ways with Assad but rather frustration with the regime's poor performance on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.

Read a summary or watch video of this energetic debate on how Washington should balance vitally important relationships with Turkey and the Syrian Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State.