All Policy Analysis by James Jeffrey

A former U.S. Army commander and a distinguished diplomat discuss how the nuclear deal could compromise longstanding U.S. interests in the Middle East if Washington does not do a better job of countering Iran's destabilizing ambitions.

If the president's bet on Iran's transformation does not prove to be immediately and demonstrably right, his larger project could suffer the same fate as Bush's in the hands of his successor.

As bold reform efforts and political deadlines roil Baghdad and Erbil, Washington should help resolve the crises as soon as possible so that Iraq can turn back to the urgent fight against ISIS.

If realist opponents of the Iran agreement insist that the JCPOA must go, they will need to explain in detail how the limited alternatives at Washington's disposal are worth the profound risks of killing the current deal.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

The following item appeared in the "Letters to the Editor" section of the Washington Post on July 21 . As a critic of many administration decisions on Iran, I have sympathy for Eric Edelman's and Ray Takeyh's problems with the Iran deal but disagree with their suggested response: Congress kills

The final agreement lies somewhere in between the April 2 interim parameters and Khamenei's maximalist demands, but whether Iran will adhere to the seemingly favorable terms is another question.

Nothing, including reluctantly accepting a bad agreement, is as dangerous as leaving open the question of how the United States would react if Iran approaches a nuclear weapons capability.

The Obama administration appears to be walking back from a full accounting of Tehran's nuclear weaponization efforts, leaving ample room for further clandestine research and weakening a central pillar of the global nonproliferation regime.

Any agreement should be judged not only by its verifiable nuclear restraints, but also by the credibility of U.S. readiness to contain the regime's asymmetrical military, ideological, religious, economic, and diplomatic moves in the region.

The blame game appears so blatant that one might even conclude the administration is intent on throwing in the towel against ISIS.

The Middle East state system is under relentless pressure, and preserving it will require a long-term vision for shoring up U.S. allies, rolling back ISIL, and countering the Iranians.