Policy Analysis

The time for inertia is over—this summer, Security Council members will have a rare and urgent chance to break the spell of illusory “peacekeeping” and advance a model that actually helps keep the peace between Israel and Lebanon.

An in-depth study of how the Islamic State’s administrative apparatus and activities in its Syrian “capital” affected local residents, and how it sought to instrumentalize the populace in a quest to sustain its wider international state-building project for the long term.

The Iran-backed militant group is signaling its seriousness about elections, aiming for better results in heavily populated Basra, and seeking to keep its rivals separated.

After an encouraging Trump-Sharaa meeting, Washington and its partners must now facilitate the complex work of creating timelines and implementing new security arrangements to constrain the jihadist group.

A ten-year memorandum of understanding lapses during the president’s term, and he will have to decide whether negotiating a new deal serves American interests.

Four experts discuss what the Trump administration needs to do to follow through on the landmark talks with President Sharaa, from sorting through the complex web of sanctions to managing allied expectations and safely handing over the counter-IS mission.

Now is the time to exert Washington's greatly expanded leverage, forcing Tehran to choose between a painful future with enrichment and other subversive tools in its arsenal or a hopeful future without them.

Given their deep historical and present-day coordination, Beirut needs to change its mindset of treating these groups separately and formulate a unified strategy for disarming them all—and the sooner the better.

Health officials have compiled a largely comprehensive list, but questions remain about the Gaza ministry’s opaque revision process and vetting of family reports—along with unknown deaths and missing persons.

Although Hamas is still unwilling to discuss full disarmament, granting safe passage to hundreds of commanders could have similar effects on the ground while enabling the parties to end the fighting and reach a viable “day after” agreement.

Even before a high-profile new attack in the east, shifting trends in the number, nature, and location of plots showed why the United States isn’t quite ready to take a victory lap in the battle against IS in Syria.

The two Gulf states are combining fossil fuel production with ambitions to become low-carbon leaders, and Washington risks getting left behind if it ignores the trend.

Despite the embarrassing PR, “mowing the grass” by targeting Houthi capabilities and personnel has value if repeated periodically—perhaps by an Israeli-Arab “Red Sea security group” if Washington is no longer willing to take the lead.

New developments in the PKK-Turkey peace process are a window of opportunity for Iraqi Kurdish parties to stabilize areas of Iraqi Kurdistan affected by the conflict and help facilitate a lasting peace.

In this final of several daily videos from Washington Institute scholars, Robert Satloff summarizes the economic, diplomatic, and cultural implications of President Trump's May 2025 trip to the Gulf region.

Two of Prime Minister Sudani's partners in government—the terrorist groups Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq—have stepped up their efforts to bar Syria's new president from a Baghdad summit.

In this fifth of several daily videos from Washington Institute scholars, Elizabeth Dent shares details of deals reached or announced in Abu Dhabi on the third day of President Trump's May 2025 trip to the Gulf region.

In this fourth of several daily videos from Washington Institute scholars, Simon Henderson presents details of economic and diplomatic initiatives involving Qatar on the second day of President Trump's May 2025 trip to the Gulf region.

Israel sees its next operation in Gaza as a means to decisively damage Hamas’s military and governance capabilities while freeing the rest of the hostages, but the plan might also produce a lengthy occupation and expanded guerrilla warfare.

Until now, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had been happy with the comparisons his hard-core supporters make between him and Ali ibn Abi Talib—Shia Islam’s first divinely ordained Imam. Ironically, this insistence on Khamenei’s infallability, combined with the current acquiescence to strategic flexibility or policy concession, is eroding that sense of trust with Khamenei’s core base of hardline supporters.