Policy Analysis

Although America’s defensive and preventive mechanisms are much stronger today, the global jihadist situation in 2026 is uncomfortably similar to the 1990s, when the movement was treated as a manageable nuisance even as it quietly consolidated sanctuaries, built financial autonomy, and experimented with new methods of attack.

Watch a conversation with three former directors of the National Counterterrorism Center as they look back on a quarter century of combating the global terrorist threat.

Faced with brain drain, ideological distortion, and a wavering strategic focus, U.S. counterterrorism officials are being asked to do more with less today than their predecessors post-9/11.

Given the kingdom’s simultaneous push for more technological autonomy and more American business deals, Washington should seek deeper—but conditional—cooperation that is closely tied to the broader strategic partnership.

Although the outcome is unlikely to affect core U.S. policy issues such as the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco’s participation in Gaza peacekeeping efforts, Washington should remain vigilant about the potential political impact of widespread disaffection, especially among the kingdom’s younger generations.

U.S. officials have demurred when asked about targeting Tehran’s most crucial Chinese lifelines, and Beijing has plenty of trade and export leverage to continue deterring Washington.

America can win if it maintains the blockade on Iran while gradually increasing pressure; the challenge is to ensure that Tehran doesn’t respond by starting another region-wide conflict.

Targeting a UAE-based bank with a serious but time-delayed action could have beneficial cautionary effects—though the wider problem of illicit Iranian financing in the Emirates will require a more concerted and lengthy Treasury Department campaign.

The visit will probably confirm the growth trend in Egypt and China’s economic, technological, and perhaps even defense relations, though Cairo is unlikely to get the help it wants on regional security threats posed by Iran and the Houthis.

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.

If done astutely, absorbing SDF personnel into the central government can preserve years of U.S. relationship-building and institutional knowledge while giving Washington a unique channel to build trust with Damascus.

As the army, the RSF, and civilian forces debate this question, the international Quintet faces growing obstacles to building an inclusive political process.

With Assad-era laws increasingly triggered by private complaints and enforced unevenly, U.S. officials can no longer relegate these issues to secondary tracks or assume that core administration objectives will remain unaffected.

Ukrainian cooperation with Gulf states on drone and counter-drone technologies is expanding as they contend with similar threats and concerns, so Washington should do whatever it can to enable and coordinate this growth.

In launching its newly announced “Operation Economic Outcast,” the Trump administration’s primary beachhead should be the UAE, which has signaled a shift in the right direction but will need targeted U.S. help with cutting off illicit Iranian transactions.

Libyans are fed up with temporary solutions, but Washington’s current approach is structured to be just that—another transitional phase that lets political elites keep postponing elections and reform.

International actors, while expressing confidence in the country’s political progress, struggled to adapt to economic resistance from the national labor union, the destabilizing effects of terrorism, and interference from outside actors.

The United States eased its fertilizer restrictions on the kingdom to manage a supply emergency, but Morocco could also become a key source of purified phosphoric acid—a crucial product tied to growing competition with China over battery production, supply chain integrity, and access to critical minerals.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

Iraqi sales to Asian markets rely heavily on the strait, and efforts to establish viable alternative routes would have to overcome considerable logistical challenges—not to mention Baghdad’s bad track record with pipelines.