Policy Analysis

Authorities should view the end of UNIFIL not as a prelude to a security vacuum, but as a chance to establish a workable U.S.-led transition mechanism that brings in Arab, European, and international partners, with the ultimate goal of helping Lebanon exercise full sovereignty over its territory without the support of foreign forces.

Tehran will likely double down on missiles and drones—its most effective weapons during recent conflicts—creating path dependencies that could become critical vulnerabilities if U.S. and partner countermeasures improve further.

As Baghdad moves to the next phase for IS-linked detainees transferred from Syria, Washington should encourage repatriation, fair trials, and cooperation between partners on building a sustainable longer-term framework.

The conditions that created the war will likely recur if Sudan’s military stays fragmented between so many semi-autonomous armed groups.

Despite its underwhelming results, the war has demonstrated that many American partners in the region are able and willing to shoulder a greater burden in securing common interests—though that may not mean much without a more careful and collaborative U.S. policy planning process.

The latest Houthi offensive has shattered the status quo along Yemen’s west coast, upended a years-long truce, and set the stage for further consolidation of their control in the north—but the victory is also Iran’s.

The United States is safer from catastrophic terrorism, but emerging technologies, weakened international partnerships, and allied military drawdowns in Africa are creating new blind spots.

America’s institutional knowledge about global jihadist terrorism took decades to accumulate, but it could disappear much faster.

Three top former counterterrorism officials look back on a quarter-century of combating the global terrorist threat, discussing how their setbacks and successes can help Washington fill gaps in its current CT approach.

Hezbollah and Amal are already manipulating where donor funding goes and who gets credit for reconstruction, so Washington and its partners should coordinate ways to bypass them before the country’s wider reconstruction effort begins in earnest—starting with the first batch of “pilot zones.”

Given the lack of Lebanese political will on display so far, the Trump administration and Congress need to take a tough-love approach.

Although America’s defensive and preventive mechanisms are much stronger today, the global jihadist situation in 2026 is uncomfortably similar to the 1990s, when the movement was treated as a manageable nuisance even as it quietly consolidated sanctuaries, built financial autonomy, and experimented with new methods of attack.

Faced with brain drain, ideological distortion, and a wavering strategic focus, U.S. counterterrorism officials are being asked to do more with less today than their predecessors post-9/11.

Given the kingdom’s simultaneous push for more technological autonomy and more American business deals, Washington should seek deeper—but conditional—cooperation that is closely tied to the broader strategic partnership.

Although the outcome is unlikely to affect core U.S. policy issues such as the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco’s participation in Gaza peacekeeping efforts, Washington should remain vigilant about the potential political impact of widespread disaffection, especially among the kingdom’s younger generations.

U.S. officials have demurred when asked about targeting Tehran’s most crucial Chinese lifelines, and Beijing has plenty of trade and export leverage to continue deterring Washington.

America can win if it maintains the blockade on Iran while gradually increasing pressure; the challenge is to ensure that Tehran doesn’t respond by starting another region-wide conflict.

Targeting a UAE-based bank with a serious but time-delayed action could have beneficial cautionary effects—though the wider problem of illicit Iranian financing in the Emirates will require a more concerted and lengthy Treasury Department campaign.

The visit will probably confirm the growth trend in Egypt and China’s economic, technological, and perhaps even defense relations, though Cairo is unlikely to get the help it wants on regional security threats posed by Iran and the Houthis.

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.