ایران

A congressional vote of disapproval would not necessarily be a deal breaker; in fact, it could give the administration time to improve the agreement or implement other policy measures that more effectively secure U.S. interests.

Although Iran cannot be counted out as the long-term popular champion of the Palestinian cause, a new poll indicates that the Palestinian street is up for grabs.

The Supreme Leader has remained noncommittal as usual while politicians argue about the approval process, but his hardline cadres are publicly insisting that the deal will threaten Iran's national security, damage its regional standing, and increase the risk of armed confrontation.

Since the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), members of The Washington Institute’s Iran Study Group have met to assess the agreement’s relationship to the parameters outlined in the study group’s June 24 policy statement. Members of the study group have also benefited from several hours of

In addition to Qods Force supervision of Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries, the IRGC is deploying more of its own Ground Forces personnel to Syria in direct combat roles.

The agreement does not clearly achieve its main objective of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, nor does it complement America's broader strategies regarding the Middle East and global nonproliferation.

Israelis fear that the deal will legitimize Iran as a nuclear threshold state, embolden its highly destabilizing role in a volatile Middle East, and trigger nuclear proliferation and a conventional arms race in the region.

In addition to bolstering China's own economic and energy strategy, the deal could spur Beijing to facilitate Iran's rise as a regional power via military assistance, technology transfers, and investment.

The final agreement lies somewhere in between the April 2 interim parameters and Khamenei's maximalist demands, but whether Iran will adhere to the seemingly favorable terms is another question.