U.S. Policy

The bottom line is that if lawmakers are concerned about the nuclear agreement's flaws and are hungry for the administration to take sensible measures to fix them, the limited downside of voting no is greatly exceeded by the benefits of 'a better deal.'

If realist opponents of the Iran agreement insist that the JCPOA must go, they will need to explain in detail how the limited alternatives at Washington's disposal are worth the profound risks of killing the current deal.

The Institute's managing director testified before two Senate hearings to discuss the drawbacks of the current Iran agreement, the best means of addressing them, and the implications for U.S. policy if they are not fixed.

Cairo and Washington both see the upcoming dialogue as a means of signaling that political disagreements will not torpedo the core relationship anytime soon.

The agreement does not clearly achieve its main objective of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, nor does it complement America's broader strategies regarding the Middle East and global nonproliferation.

Congressional rejection of the nuclear deal wouldn't be pretty, but a messy domestic political battle is a far cry from the president's warnings of potential war with Iran.

Tactically, the impressively detailed Iran nuclear accord masks major flaws; strategically, it heralds a profound shift in U.S. regional strategy.

Even with a deal now signed, the Obama administration still has many tools for countering Iran’s menacing behavior across the Middle East.

Over the last three years, members of this bipartisan group have convened regularly under the auspices of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss the status of the Iran nuclear issue, frequently benefitting from the input of current Administration officials. Last week, at its most recent meeting, the