Syria

Given the Syrian army’s recent deployments in Deraa and Russia’s half-hearted attempts to halt them, the situation may soon lead to renewed shelling of civilian areas and myriad complications for Israel and Jordan.

Although the pandemic’s full regional consequences remain murky, some early trends are becoming clear, from caution among certain proxy patrons, to escalation among others, and a looming financial crunch for all.

Ceasefire agreements and contagion concerns will likely limit Turkish operations in Syria for the time being, but Ankara has no such constraints in its Libya proxy war.

The rebel administration in Idlib and the Kurdish-led government in the northeast have been more proactive and transparent than the Assad regime, but their populations still need urgent, direct international aid—without the UN’s imprimatur if necessary.

Given the military situation on the ground and the overriding interests of each party, the jihadist-run rebel pocket will likely be further reduced into a small, overpopulated border strip north of the M4 highway.

How can the United States mitigate the worsening humanitarian crisis in Idlib, and what do Syrian activists on the ground want from Washington?

Given the near-certainty that conflict will erupt again in northwest Syria, the United States should start planning for how it might leverage that next outbreak to push the parties toward a political process.

Whether by force or politics, Iran desperately needs to reconsolidate power among Shia constituencies throughout the region, but this challenge may prove insurmountable given current public sentiment in Iraq and Lebanon.

Unless Washington and its allies respond to the protestors’ legitimate demands for reform, the group will survive through measures such as expanding its smuggling activity, promoting its financial institutions, and selectively scapegoating corrupt politicians.