Iraq

Striking back one time in twelve will not stop Iranian proxy attacks, so Washington must consider more consistent and painful retaliation in order to protect Americans in the Middle East.

To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group.

The complexity of Iraq’s challenges might prompt some U.S. officials to balk, but a constructive policy can help advance both Iraqi and American interests in areas ranging from counterterrorism to economic development.

Regardless of the executive branch’s willingness to confront militia abuses, true rule of law cannot take hold unless judges are protected from intimidation and corruption.

By absorbing rival organizations and favoring commanders who lack connections to other regime power centers, the IRGC has used the Qods Force to steadily centralize and monopolize control over the country’s foreign operations.

The ambitious plan would have seen Delta Crescent, a tiny Delaware company, try to bring peace and stability to the war-ravaged northeast, but local corruption, a lack of U.S. commitment, and other complications doomed the idea.

The first wave of post-arrest deception operations tried to give the false impression that militias controlled the Baghdad zone containing the prime minister's residence, the U.S. embassy, and other sensitive sites.

The May 20 Gaza protest in Baghdad saw the Tansiqiya speak in the notable absence of any Asaib Ahl al-Haq members, and the event was conspicuously ignored by AAH channels.

Hamas's example could embolden Iraqi factions to accelerate attacks on U.S. facilities at home, as well as seek some reflected glory by claiming Syria-based attacks against Israelis.