Iran's Foreign Policy

Joe Biden's victory in America may herald a measure of de-escalation with Iran, but the Supreme Leader is unlikely to be moved. Ayatollah Khamenei does not really distinguish between Democratic and Republican intentions—after all, he agreed to a nuclear deal with the Obama administration only to see President Trump tear

Delinking the embargo from the nuclear deal could offer the best hope of reducing tensions within the P5+1 while also limiting Iran’s access to sophisticated weaponry.

In an April 22 tweet, President Trump spoke of instructing the U.S. Navy to destroy any Iranian gunboats that "harass our ships at sea." Aside from whether it departed from existing U.S. rules of engagement, the statement highlighted a persistent reality: the military threat posed by Iranian forces in the

A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who

Soleimani had multiple deputies with years of experience, and the Iranian security establishment has a tradition of rewarding brazen initiative.

The steady weakening by Tehran of its international nuclear commitments will be the most immediate challenge for the next head of the world’s nuclear watchdog.

Khamenei’s latest high-profile speech may indicate his growing confidence that Iran can cope with U.S. pressure and set a high bar for resuming talks.

Seeing that the president wants out of “endless Middle East wars,” Tehran seems to think that raising the pressure might get him to back off.

The international community must take steps to empower civil society within the Islamic Republic and protect it from being systematically persecuted and oppressed.