تروریسم

The United States is safer from catastrophic terrorism, but emerging technologies, weakened international partnerships, and allied military drawdowns in Africa are creating new blind spots.

Three top former counterterrorism officials look back on a quarter-century of combating the global terrorist threat, discussing how their setbacks and successes can help Washington fill gaps in its current CT approach.

Although America’s defensive and preventive mechanisms are much stronger today, the global jihadist situation in 2026 is uncomfortably similar to the 1990s, when the movement was treated as a manageable nuisance even as it quietly consolidated sanctuaries, built financial autonomy, and experimented with new methods of attack.

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.

The Taliban has learned that it can reap substantial international rewards without budging on key security and human rights issues, but Washington can still exert pressure on crucial soft spots such as UN credentialing, Treasury Department licensing, and Central Asian project financing.

Despite recent high-profile arrests, transatlantic authorities won’t be able to meet their longer-term goals of stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza unless they take broader action against still-rampant Hamas fundraising.

The framework's success will largely depend on the creation of a U.S.-led, third-party verification system to avoid the shortcomings experienced with previous agreements, bolstered by effective intelligence support and international financing.

Even if Washington resumes negotiations, Tehran will keep sending its proxies to commit attacks, buy weapons, and establish sham charities on the continent, so European governments must crack down harder.

Although local religious and social differences would present some obstacles, the proven exportability of Rabat’s deradicalization machinery and the kingdom’s good working relations with the Israeli government make it an intriguing candidate for inclusion in the wider Gaza stabilization effort.