Iraq

U.S. Policy President Bush has made important strides in tackling the Gulf crisis during the past two weeks, consolidating his coalition and preparing the groundwork for Security Council approval of the use of force. He has begun to create an offensive option that will support coercive diplomacy or ensure military

President Bush's decision to double U.S. force deployments in the Persian Gulf was designed to scare Saddam Hussein. Instead, it has frightened the American people and threatened his coercive diplomacy strategy. The President faces a difficult dilemma. He cannot persuade Saddam Hussein of American resolve without a credible threat of

How to respond to the growing threat of war emanating from the United States presents Saddam Hussein with one of the major decisions of his career. It seems logical, but not inevitable, that he will now try to stall for time by offering to negotiate about a possible Iraqi withdrawal

Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey today, the last stop on his regional tour, to thank that country for its "steadfast" support and warn that the United States "cannot rule out the possible use of force." Turkish officials said there had been no talk about Turkey's opening a second

Secretary of State James Baker's Middle East trip is designed to firm up and define an anti- Iraq coalition held together by U.S. power, Saudi money, and Egyptian management of inter- Arab politics, while Israeli and Turkish power constrain Iraq. Recently, Syria has been the alignment's weak link, but political

With the prospect of 100,000 more U.S. troops in the Gulf and a heightened chance of war, some argue that the anti-Iraq embargo will reduce Baghdad's fighting ability. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. Any loss is likely to be far smaller than expected. In addition to stopping Iraq from acquiring

Last week's meeting between President Bush and Yevgeny Primakov, Mikhail Gorbachev's special emissary to Iraq, generated much speculation about a possible Soviet diplomatic initiative to end the Gulf crisis. Those expectations were overblown. While Primakov provided Bush a first-hand account of his discussions in Baghdad with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein

For now, the Bush administration eschews the use of force while preparing for its use. But what will happen if a consensus develops that President Bush's diplomatic and economic approach is ineffective while a full-scale attack on Iraqi forces remains unattractive? As an additional buildup of U.S. forces gets underway

The recent violence in Jerusalem has again raised fears that Iraq can utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to break the coalition opposed to its aggression. An accurate assessment of Saddam Hussein's support among non-Iraqi Arabs is critical to understanding this question, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on