منع اشاعه

The following is Dr. Levitt's contribution to a Council on Foreign Relations roundtable discussing the implications of the nuclear agreement . Iran is Hezbollah's primary benefactor, giving the Lebanese political party and militant group some $200 million a year in addition to weapons, training, intelligence, and logistical assistance. Over the

Before the nuclear deal was signed, the freezing of Iranian assets was incomplete, so the loosening of restrictions on these assets will have less impact than implied by past and current arguments.

Contrary to what the White House has said, the nuclear deal with Iran could make preventive military action an even more problematic proposition than it was before.

Now is the time for the president to state clearly that if Iran dashes toward a weapon, especially after year 15 of the deal, it will trigger the use of force.

If the Supreme Leader is able to continue his strategy of purposeful ambiguity by manipulating the media and parliament, the current deal could fall apart just as easily as past nuclear agreements.

Given Tehran's noncompliant track record and the UN Security Council's imperfect arms restrictions, the nuclear deal could allow Iran to offer its allies a growing range of weapons systems designed to increase survivability and lethality in asymmetric warfare scenarios.

Because a 'no' vote on the Iran deal would have little practical impact until next year, lawmakers have time to work with the president on making reasonable fixes to the agreement even if they disapprove it in the short term.

The Rouhani administration is insisting on the confidentiality of its 'roadmap' with the IAEA in order to quell domestic criticism of the JCPOA and bolster the nuclear program's security.

A congressional vote of disapproval would not necessarily be a deal breaker; in fact, it could give the administration time to improve the agreement or implement other policy measures that more effectively secure U.S. interests.