All Policy Analysis by Michael Knights

Tensions in Kirkuk serve as warning of the instability that could rack Mosul after its liberation.

A longtime expert on military affairs, a researcher on Shiite militias, and a retired U.S. Army colonel discuss optimal partners for defeating ISIS and the heavy risks associated with allowing Iran-associated actors to expand their influence.

The challenge posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has created some strange dynamics, among them the shared interest of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran in "degrading and defeating" the Sunni jihadist group. But this shared interest should not be viewed as an

If this national institution is properly rebuilt into a force that can score victories against the jihadists, it would be far more beneficial to Iraq than expanding Shiite militias or local Sunni uprisings.

Patiently rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces is key to defeating terrorism and cutting militias back down to size, but Baghdad may decide to move on Mosul before it is ready.

Leaders in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan have taken a brave step toward reunifying the country through revenue sharing. The United States should support implementation of the deal.

The Kurds may be leveraging recent arms agreements to achieve a more direct security relationship with Western powers on the road toward de facto autonomy.

At this crucial time in Iraq's history, only one factor is holding the country together: the wealth created by the south's oil exports, and how these funds will be distributed in the 2015 budget.

The pundits have it wrong -- the group's move toward Baghdad is a sign of desperation.

Washington is relying on local forces to carry out ground operations following airstrikes against ISIS, but disunity within the Kurdish ranks may hamper their ability to defeat the insurgents.

Given the group's brutal, nihilistic approach to territories it has seized, any anti-ISIL uprisings that are well planned and externally supported will eventually succeed.

Washington should keep pressuring Baghdad to make early, ungrudging goodwill gestures toward the Kurds instead of reverting to hardball negotiations and broken promises.

Washington Institute research explains the complexities of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

Much of the group's early military success was due to the weakness and unpreparedness of its enemies, so the right blend of countermeasures could still roll it back.