The Israel-Hamas War 2023: Frequently Asked Questions

Hamas FAQ animation

The October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack was the single deadliest day in Israel’s history. Israel has responded by declaring war on Hamas.

Below are answers to frequently asked questions derived from the recent work of Washington Institute scholars. Read the footnoted articles for their full analysis.

During this developing story, return to the Institute’s website for updates, and follow the Institute and its scholars on Facebook, X (the former Twitter), Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube.

Read an Institute statement on the conflict.

The questions are:

  1. What is Hamas and what does it believe?
  2. What is the history of the Israel-Hamas relationship?
  3. Why now?
  4. What is the nature of collaboration between Hamas and Iran?
  5. What are Israel’s objectives?
  6. Will the war expand?
  7. What is the regional response?
  8. What can the United States do?
  9. Who will rule Gaza?

The Fellows are:

 

What Is the U.S.-Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Hamas and What Does It Believe?

 

TWI Statement

Hamas is not just some political party with a “military wing,” for whom control of Gaza is a great achievement. It came to power through a violent coup and is motivated by a warped jihadist ideology that it has imposed on the people of Gaza, who should not themselves be equated with Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist organization committed to the destruction of the Jewish state. Indeed, the horrific attacks of October 7 were a reminder that Israel’s decades-long battle for survival—within any borders—is not over, despite the dramatic progress made toward regional peace.

In its brutality, Hamas has shown itself to be in the same category as groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—except that Hamas is connected to a wider network whose participant groups are influenced or controlled to varying degrees by Iran. This network includes Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and most of Iraq’s Shia militias, who collectively pose a multifaceted threat to the United States and its allies in the region.

Hamas Attacks: A Turning Point for U.S. Policy, A Statement of Washington Institute Experts

Omari

Palestinian society, like every other Arab society, has always had a component that is Islamist, that is, a believer in the Muslim Brotherhood approach to Islamism. Yet traditionally, the Islamists in the Palestinian arena really remained outside the nationalist, “liberation” struggle. They were doing religious work, charity, etc.

This changed in 1987. In 1987, when the first intifada had just started, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine decided that they needed to create their own organization that would get involved in this dynamic, and so Hamas was created. Hamas is an acronym that stands for the Islamic Resistance Movement. Interestingly, the word Palestine does not appear on it because they always saw themselves as something bigger than simply Palestine.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Margolin

Hamas’ 1988 charter declares the group “one of the wings of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine” while also calling itself “a distinguished Palestinian movement.” Today it remains the only Brotherhood-linked group that has not denounced violence. As a Brotherhood-inspired group, Hamas believes in using existing political institutions to garner power and authority, while simultaneously establishing a social service infrastructure and conducting missionary work to gain popular support. It was this approach that later helped the group take part in, and win, Palestinian elections.

Yet violence has always been a driving part of the group and its goals. As Article 12 of the 1988 Hamas charter notes, “Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Muslim land. Resisting and quelling the enemy become the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female.”

"A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy," October 16, 2023, War On The Rocks

Omari

Initially, in the 1980s, Hamas was really an irritant—I say of course a violent irritant, a bloody irritant—but it was not seen as a strategic threat. This changed with the [1993] Oslo Accords. With the Oslo Accords, there was the chance for Hamas to distinguish itself when the PLO [the Palestine Liberation Organization] bought into the idea of diplomacy and a two-state solution. This was the opportunity for Hamas to start distinguishing itself. It came out very strong in opposition to Oslo, in opposition to any kind of accommodation with Israel, and with a renewed commitment to violence and terror.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Margolin

Since its inception, Hamas’ military wing has kept up militaristic operations over the years, targeting civilians and military alike. This includes a wave of suicide bombings — by male and later female perpetrators — in Israel, during the first and second intifadas, including twin 1996 suicide bombings on buses in Jerusalem that killed 45 and a 2002 Netanya hotel attack that killed 30. The group has also taken adult male hostages into Gaza in the past, including Gilad Shalit, who was released in a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel for approximately 1,000 prisoners in Israeli jails after five years in captivity.

"A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy," October 16, 2023, War On The Rocks

Ross

In September 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the withdrawal of all Israeli soldiers and settlers from the Gaza Strip. The historic decision to leave meant that Palestinians could finally determine the fate of Gaza. It was a hopeful moment. For decades, Gaza’s destiny had been shaped by others; now Gazans themselves were in charge. It seemed possible to imagine a future in which Gazan leaders transformed the strip from an incubator of terrorism into a prototype for a peaceful, modernizing, and stable Palestinian state.

But Hamas rejected that path. Despite the departure of Israeli troops and settlers, Hamas kept up its attacks on Israel, hitting the Gaza-Israel crossing points multiple times in the first six months after withdrawal. These crossing points were vital for the flow of goods and people into and out of Gaza, and they benefited Palestinians, not Israelis. Yet Hamas’s attacks led Israel to reduce the number of crossing points from six to two. The Palestinians of Gaza were paying the price for Hamas’s actions.

Despite Hamas’s attacks at the crossings, Israel did not impose a blockade on Gaza until Hamas’s de facto takeover of the strip in 2007. A year earlier, Hamas had defeated its Palestinian rival Fatah in an election, but because it refused to accept the conditions of the Quartet (the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and the United States) for recognition—renouncing violence, accepting the Oslo agreements, and recognizing Israel—Washington and most European countries refused to deal with Hamas or provide it assistance. Then, in June 2007, Hamas ousted the Palestinian Authority and Fatah in a military coup, seizing Gaza’s governing institutions and causing Israel to close border crossings, as well as air and sea access to the strip. Once more, Palestinians suffered.

Hamas seems to specialize in making Palestinians pay. Since taking power in Gaza, it has provoked conflicts with Israel in 2008–9, 2012, 2014, and 2021—with more limited skirmishes with the Israelis in the years between. Aside from consolidating its control, Hamas’s main agenda for Gaza is building its own military infrastructure and arsenal. It has constructed dozens of miles of underground tunnels—not to provide shelters for the people of Gaza but to protect its own fighters and weapons. The cement, steel, copper, wood, and electrical wiring that has been lavished on this vast subterranean network could have been used above ground, to serve and develop one of the poorest and most densely populated areas in the world. But Hamas’s priority is destroying Israel, not building Gaza. Hamas’s ideological aims are negative, not positive ones that might help Palestinians.

"What Israel Must Do: Disarming Hamas Will Be Costly but Essential for Peace," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Margolin

[D]espite its slightly softer rhetoric in recent years, resistance has remained a core principle for Hamas, which notes in its updated 2017 document, “Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right, a duty, and an honor for all the sons and daughters of our people and our umma.” Hamas remains committed to its original goal — leading the Palestinian people in a violent struggle against Israel by any means necessary.

"A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy," October 16, 2023, War On The Rocks

Omari

[Hamas] said they were willing to accept a Palestinian state on the '67 borders, and many in the world focused on that part of their statement, forgetting the second part: "We will never accept Israel." Because the very idea of a two-state solution is anathema to what Hamas stands for.

Yet in governing Gaza, it was very clear that they were as corrupt as the Palestinian Authority, that they were as intolerant—even more intolerant—of anyone of any kind of dissent. Today, if you look at public opinion polling, Hamas is not governing by any stretch of the imagination for being popular. They are governing by force, oppression, etc.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Cleveland, Pollock

According to the latest Washington Institute polling, conducted in July 2023, Hamas’s decision to break the ceasefire was not a popular move. While the majority of Gazans (65%) did think it likely that there would be “a large military conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza” this year, a similar percentage (62%) supported Hamas maintaining a ceasefire with Israel. Moreover, half (50%) agreed with the following proposal: “Hamas should stop calling for Israel’s destruction, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.” Moreover, across the region, Hamas has lost popularity over time among many Arab publics. This decline in popularity may have been one of the motivating factors behind the group’s decision to attack.

In fact, Gazan frustration with Hamas governance is clear; most Gazans expressed a preference for PA administration and security officials over Hamas—the majority of Gazans (70%) supported a proposal of the PA sending “officials and security officers to Gaza to take over the administration there, with Hamas giving up separate armed units,” including 47% who strongly agreed. Nor is this a new view—this proposal has had majority support in Gaza since first polled by The Washington Institute in 2014.

"Polls Show Majority of Gazans Were Against Breaking Ceasefire; Hamas and Hezbollah Unpopular Among Key Arab Publics," Washington Institute Fikra Forum, October 10, 2023

Omari

Hamas, and not only Hamas, I think many in the kind of Muslim Brotherhood movement have tried to distinguish themselves from the Salafi Jihadi, ISIS Al-Qaeda types, saying we are not terrorists, we are “freedom fighters.” They have tried to present this kind of image yet if you look at the discourse, at the narrative, at the Arabic messaging that Hamas has been engaged in since its creation, it is all about killing the Jews. It is all about focusing on this kind of violence this is part of what Hamas stands for. What we saw on Saturday I think exposes the true nature of Hamas. Anyone who has engaged with Hamas in the past knows this. If you look at how Hamas even approached its opponents on the Palestinians side, throwing them from the rooftops, etcetera. So none of this is surprising.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Margolin

Historically, in its violent attacks, Hamas has generally targeted adults, whom the group sees as legitimate targets. Though it has also indiscriminately targeted civilians through rocket attacks or suicide bombings, the group views these civilian casualties as collateral damage. This time, however, was different. The group’s decision to explicitly target vulnerable groups like children and the elderly last weekend seemingly represents a major pivot in Hamas’ strategy.

"A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy," October 16, 2023, War On The Rocks

Levitt

In a statement released on October 7, Ismail Haniyeh, a senior political leader of Hamas, lauded his group’s “great victory” and “dazzling triumph.” He hailed its “pious and courageous fighters” and railed against the “defeatists”—Arab leaders who are pursuing normalization with Israel. Then, showing Hamas’s true colors, Haniyeh pledged to extend the fighting to the West Bank and farther into Israel and called on the “entire Arab-Muslim community” to join the battle however they can. The objective? To free Hamas prisoners from Israeli jails and then “liberate” the al Aqsa mosque and all of historic Palestine; in other words, destroy Israel.

"The War Hamas Always Wanted: How the Group’s Attack Could Disrupt the Emerging Order in the Middle East," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

 

What Is the History of the Israel-Hamas Relationship?

 

Neumann

Over the years, there was kind of wishful thinking in Israel that maybe since Hamas became sovereign in the Gaza Strip it would gradually become more moderate and focus on civil affairs rather than its obligation to the “resistance” or to the military.

Because there was no proper solution, Israel and Hamas managed to create a kind of modus vivendi, a partial and temporary coexistence. Hamas and Israel actually played a kind of game: Israel accepted the sovereignty of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Israel bought from Hamas a period of relative quiet.

Israel actually reduced the scope of the blockade and let Hamas upgrade its capability in the Gaza Strip. But Hamas managed to find another formula: “We will keep quiet on the Gaza Strip but in the meantime, we will send our arms to the other areas: The West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and even to East Jerusalem and Israeli Arabs.”

We [in the Israeli security community] asked ourselves from time to time whether we saw any sign that Hamas had become moderate. Two decades after Hamas took control took over the Gaza Strip we did not find any. Hamas stuck to its vision and its goal. We could see that it was pragmatic but not moderate.

We actually were familiar with Hamas’s strategy. Hamas has always talked about the great campaign, the military campaign, that would lead to the destruction or defeat of Israel. We also speculated that this would be a multi-dimension campaign, which means through the air, through the land, through the sea. It will also include rocket attacks and kidnapping.

According to Hamas, the whole campaign was actually prepared to create the conditions to establish an Islamic State between the river and the sea.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Schenker

One early take away from this outrage is that Israel’s longstanding strategy of “wars between the wars”—the plan to constrain its Iranian proxy adversaries through limited kinetic action—was insufficient. The other is that the “money for calm” arrangement in Gaza, predicated on the notion that Hamas actually cared about ruling the territory, was flawed. In the aftermath of October 7, Israel’s security paradigm should change.

For more than a decade, Israel’s political and security establishment has been narrowly focused on the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons program. While the IDF periodically targeted Hamas assets and personnel as well as Iranian forward operating positions in Syria, Israel has largely avoided largescale operations against Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The reticence to seriously militarily degrade these terrorist organizations was understandable; an Iranian nuclear weapon is an existential threat, while Hezbollah and Hamas were considered a deadly, but tactical challenge.

"Israel Focused on the Wrong Iranian Threat, With Deadly Results," October 10, 2023

 

Why Now?

 

Satloff

Hamas started this for three reasons: To activate a multi-front threat to Israel; Second, to fill a vacuum in Palestinian leadership; and third, to stop the march toward regional peace, including the Saudi-Israeli agreement about which there was so much talk in recent weeks.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Levitt

Although the massacre likely took months to plan, the decision to execute it now appears to be tied to Hamas’s fears over Israel and Saudi Arabia normalizing relations and the opportunity presented by the political and social disarray plaguing Israel.

In September, Israeli forces ejected Palestinian worshipers from the site to allow Israeli settlers to visit. After October 7, Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’s military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, justified the attacks on Israeli civilians as a defense of al Aqsa, even calling the attack “Operation al Aqsa Flood.” The call to defend al Aqsa makes for good propaganda, and it may even mobilize others to act. But this appeal is a pretext, not a precipitant, for the war Hamas has launched.

Hamas also understood that the Gaza border was vulnerable to attack since Israeli military officials had reduced the number of Israeli troops there, relying more on surveillance systems, sensors, and remotely automated machine guns.

"The War Hamas Always Wanted: How the Group’s Attack Could Disrupt the Emerging Order in the Middle East," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Omari

But the real focus of Hamas has been on the West Bank, and for the West Bank, they have actually three interconnected objectives. First, they hope that they will use the West Bank as a way of opening another front, meaning using terror attacks. So far, we have seen no successful terror attacks coming from the West Bank. Whether they will succeed or not remains to be seen.

They have also been hoping to mobilize the public to stand up, basically to ignite a third intifada. In doing this, they had actually an assessment of the situation in the West Bank. They have seen the weakness and fragility of the Palestinian Authority—and we will get to that in a minute—and they are hoping that the anger that the public has on the one hand towards the Palestinian Authority and on the other hand towards Israel will translate into mass demonstrations.

The third point, which really encompasses both, is an attempt to basically lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

 

What Is the Nature of Collaboration Between Hamas and Iran?

 

Neumann

The turning point [between Hamas and Iran] was in 2021 when [Hamas leader] Yahya Sinwar decided to set aside the modus vivendi with Israel to launch rockets at Jerusalem. He managed to surprise Israel and also unify the whole Palestinian arena: The Israeli Arabs, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and East Jerusalem. I think at this point Iran understood that Hamas is an asset that it could take advantage of, and to cooperate with not just as a sponsor but as an ally. Together they would be able to harm Israel from different fronts and weaken Israel. The Iranians reasoned that if Israel is weaker it cannot focus on Iran.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Levitt

Officials from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s Quds Force have been meeting regularly in Iran and Lebanon for years. Following the May 2021 rocket war between Hamas and Israel, the editor of a Lebanese newspaper affiliated with Hezbollah reported that Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran coordinated the fighting from a “joint war room” in Beirut.

"The War Hamas Always Wanted: How the Group’s Attack Could Disrupt the Emerging Order in the Middle East," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Schenker

Meanwhile, under Iranian supervision, these organizations increased their cooperation. Hamas can now be firmly counted among Iran’s proxies, actively coordinating with Tehran and Hezbollah. Since August, according to the Wall Street Journal, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Ismail Qaani has been meeting biweekly in Beirut with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad leadership to plan the October 7 attack. Qaani is now reportedly in Lebanon, helping to orchestrate the Hamas campaign from the front. Given the close ties, it’s difficult to imagine that Hamas did not secure a commitment from Hezbollah to mobilize—much like it did in 2006 after Hamas kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

"Israel Focused on the Wrong Iranian Threat, With Deadly Results," October 10, 2023

Levitt

This series of attacks, this exact series of attacks, comes straight out of the Hezbollah playbook that Israel's Northern Command has been practicing and training to counter for several years now, whether coming overland, underground, or by air. There were plans by the IDF to counter Hezbollah plots to enter Israeli territory, kill as many people as possible, take over towns and raise the Hezbollah flag for that media moment, capture as many people as possible, and take them back into Lebanon, all while shooting rockets.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Satloff

What we saw this weekend was not just an Israeli tragedy, it was the most significant act of terror against Americans outside U.S. soil since September 11. For Hamas, a radical Sunni group, one of the very few rationales for making common ground with the radical Shiite group, Hezbollah, or the radical Shiite regime of Iran, where do they have common ground? It is their fight against the great Satan and their fight against the Lesser Satan. Israel, we should remind everyone, is the Lesser Satan. America, Israel's friend, ally, and supporter, has always been the great Satan.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

 

What Are Israel’s Objectives?

 

Satloff

First, to decapitate Hamas military leadership and to destroy residual military capability. Second, to instill confidence among the Israeli people once again that the government of Israel and the IDF provide for their security, confidence that has been sorely shaken in recent days. Third, to replace in the minds of regional actors, friends, foes, and would-be friends, the perception of Israeli vulnerability and weakness that was produced over the weekend and replace it with the idea of Israeli power, dominance, and invincibility.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Palti

This is Israel’s goal: That Hamas is not going to control Gaza anymore. We will do an incursion and we will not let Hamas gather force again. And we will do everything in order to prevent Hamas from strangling and suffocating the Gaza population, and perpetrating terrorist attacks against us.

"The Israel-Hamas War and U.S. Policy: An Update," by David Makovsky, Zohar Palti, Grant Rumley, Neomi Neumann, and Ghaith al-Omari, October 18, 2023

Neumann

The aim is now to topple the Hamas regime. This means that it will take a long time, tremendous effort, and a lot of Israeli casualties. It won't be easy. I think that the real thing now is that Israel, the United States, and international parties need to sit together right now and think about what should we do the day after Hamas is eliminated. How can we design or redesign the shape of the Middle East and the Palestinian arena to avoid another event like this?

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Ross

Now Israel must contemplate difficult and far-reaching steps. It can no longer be satisfied with a punishing response, followed by a return to the status quo. The assumption that Israel could live with Hamas and manage periodic conflicts with it has been shattered. It is determined that Hamas will never again be able to threaten the Israeli people. Israelis across the political spectrum now believe that Hamas must be destroyed as a military power and that Gaza must be demilitarized. Israel will no longer accept a truce with Hamas.

"What Israel Must Do: Disarming Hamas Will Be Costly but Essential for Peace," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Schenker

In the coming weeks and months, as Israel mourns the unimaginable loss and contends with the challenge of securing the hostages, Jerusalem will have to craft a new approach to Iran that treats Hamas and PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad], in addition to Hezbollah, as tools of the Islamic Republic. These proxies, which have limited popularity at home, also demonstrate little regard for the well-being of their countrymen. As a result, Israel’s deterrent strategy, which relies on the threat of bombing Lebanon and Gaza back to the Stone Age—i.e., the “Dahiya doctrine”—needs to be revisited. So too will tactical truces, like Israel has repeatedly pursued in recent years with Hamas.

"Israel Focused on the Wrong Iranian Threat, With Deadly Results," October 10, 2023

 

Will the War Expand?

 

Palti

Israel’s main effort is Gaza right now but simultaneously we have to look at Lebanon. Hezbollah is trying to challenge us with terrorist incidents all across the border. Hezbollah is not “all-in” yet, and I hope they will not get involved. We are watching Iran, Syria, the Houthis [in Yemen], and mainly the West Bank.

"The Israel-Hamas War and U.S. Policy: An Update," by David Makovsky, Zohar Palti, Grant Rumley, Neomi Neumann, and Ghaith al-Omari, October 18, 2023

Eisenstadt, Knights

As Israel conducts its war against Hamas in Gaza, a major challenge for the United States will be preventing escalation via the participation of Hezbollah, pro-Iran Iraqi militias in Syria or Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and perhaps even Iran. Such a regionalization of the war could have catastrophic consequences for the security of Israel and other U.S. partners, for regional stability, and for American interests in the Middle East and beyond. Accordingly, Washington should proactively try to shape the calculus of these actors by making clear, through words and deeds, that their participation in the conflict would elicit a strong U.S. response.

"Deterring Escalation and Expansion of the Gaza War by Iran’s 'Axis of Resistance,'" October 13, 2023

Ghaddar

As the Israel-Hamas war advances, the clashes along the Lebanese-Israeli border indicate that Hezbollah does not want to engage beyond the implied rules of conflict that were set with Israel after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war—at least, not yet. The group wants to reap the benefits of the war without risking the loss of its strategic position in Lebanon. But this calculated engagement could shift at any moment, and become a full-scale Hezbollah-Israel war due to miscalculations or a change in the Hezbollah and Iranian leadership’s assessments.

If Hezbollah decided to enter the war, the group would likely launch thousands of its missiles per day and use the precision ones to target sensitive Israeli infrastructure. However, the threat of these missiles has been, so far, more powerful than the missiles themselves: If Hezbollah uses them, it will lose them, and it will take many years and incalculable effort and resources to restock its arsenal. Hezbollah would be more exposed without this major threat, and Iran would lose its strongest pressure tools in the next phase of the war.

So far, the so-called “united front” [of Iranian proxies] has not been fully activated against Israel, mainly because Tehran doesn’t see an added value for this escalation yet. The Hamas attack that led to the conflict has already provided the Iranian regime with ample gains.

First, the Saudi-Israeli deal is now frozen until further notice. Second, after a number of Israeli attacks on its facilities in Syria, and covert attacks inside Iran, the regime can say that it finally responded and hope to deter Israel against more attacks. Third, the Hamas attack has exposed a shocking Israeli military weakness and intelligence failure, which Iran’s domestic and regional media are still exploiting. Fourth, Iran energized the resistance rhetoric among many in the Middle East, which will boost Ian’s standing in the Arab street.

For the Iranian regime, the war has already boosted its position and power in the region, and involving Hezbollah could risk all these advantages. Expending the Hezbollah card now might not add to these gains—on the contrary, Iran would lose its strongest bargaining chip in a long conflict that could involve many actors.

"Will Hezbollah Hold Back or Escalate?" October 15, 2023

 

What Is the Regional Response?

 

TWI Research

The UAE, Bahrain, and China all modified their primary statements to include explicit condemnation of the killing and kidnapping of Israeli civilians. The UAE and Bahrain also revised their initial statements to specifically condemn Hamas. In the Middle East and North Africa, a slim majority condemned all violence, with almost an equal number either condemning Israel or offering full-throated support to Hamas.

"International Reactions to the Hamas Attack on Israel," by Cleary Waldo, Gabriel Epstein, Sydney Hilbush, Aaron Y. Zelin , October 11, 2023

Levitt

I think that if I were sitting in Riyadh or if I were sitting in Abu Dhabi or if I were sitting in Jerusalem one of my big takeaways now, and I think it will still be the case in several weeks, is that the regional moderates really do have a lot to be afraid of from Iran and its proxies. Their interest in joining forces for a lot of positive reasons having nothing to do with Iran but also because of a desire to share in intelligence, information, technology, counter-drone technology, and more is very real. I think that in the long run, Iran and Hezbollah--and most certainly Hamas--have only driven that home.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Omari

In the short term, for the duration of the fighting in Gaza and its immediate aftermath, a [Saudi] deal with Israel is out of the question. In the long term, however, it is unclear how a conflict between Hamas and Israel will change the basic interests that drove Saudi Arabia to seek relations with Israel. Both countries share larger security concerns in the region, including containing Iran and limiting Islamic extremism. And both countries seek to benefit from stronger economic ties, especially as Saudi Arabia proceeds with its Vision 2030 plan to diversify its economy.

"Hamas Has Fractured the Arab World," October 13, 2023, Foreign Affairs

 

What Can the United States Do?

 

TWI Statement

The fact that America faces urgent strategic challenges around the world does not mean we have the luxury of faltering in the vital work of protecting our interests in the Middle East—not least because the region’s resources and geographic centrality affect long-term global competition. Whether we like it or not, the Middle East demands our consistent attention and focus.

Hamas Attacks: A Turning Point for U.S. Policy, A Statement of Washington Institute Experts

Omari

Confronted with this highly complex regional landscape, the United States must try to balance potentially conflicting objectives, including backing Israel in its response to Hamas’s unprecedented attack, preventing a wider war, stabilizing the West Bank, and managing its relations with its Arab partners.

"Hamas Has Fractured the Arab World," October 13, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Ghaddar

Iran and the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] need to be made aware of the risks to their own political and military infrastructure if Hezbollah intervenes. The decision is in Tehran’s hands—before the regime makes up its mind, Washington should make clear what will happen if it continues using Arab proxies to target Israelis and Americans.

"Hezbollah Miscalculations and the Gaza War," Oct 12, 2023,

Rumley

Hezbollah and Iran might also want to have their proxies and partners—namely, Syria-based militias, Iraqi Shia militias, and Yemen’s Houthis—open additional fronts with Israel and thereby complicate its military calculus. Israel would certainly face significant challenges striking targets in Iraq and Yemen, especially while engaged in operations in Gaza and along its northern border. This is where quiet U.S. messaging to Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, the Assad regime in Syria, and Iran may bolster Israel’s warnings. Media reports noting U.S. intelligence support for Israeli preparations to respond to a potential Houthi strike by hitting their missile and drone forces or leadership targets might help deter the Yemen-based group. And beyond the threat of a forceful U.S. military response to attacks on American personnel and interests in Syria and Iraq, the most useful way to keep Iraqi militias out of a war with Israel involves threats by the U.S. Treasury Department to prioritize and expedite the blacklisting of banks associated with such militias for abuses of the U.S. dollar.

"U.S. Wartime Support to Israel: First Steps and Future Considerations," October 12, 2023

Makovsky

Biden’s three sets of White House remarks were effective for different reasons. They had an extraordinary and immediate impact inside Israel…. Public reaction, judging from Israeli TV and social media, ranged from grateful to ecstatic.

The promise of genuine US wartime military assistance was the most vivid reminder that Israel is not alone in its moment of peril. It has become an article of faith in Israel that it will be left alone when it comes to Iran. Though sharp and important differences remain between the U.S. and Israel regarding strategies in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, suddenly Biden is warning Tehran and Hezbollah. He exhorted against exploiting this hour of grieving to start a regional war of missile-armed proxies with Israel with a single word: “Don’t.”

Yet all of the above should not be misunderstood: Biden will not offer any Israeli leader a blank check during the Gaza crisis. Biden’s refusal to see Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for most of this past year reflected his belief that when it came to the judicial overhaul, Netanyahu was not acting in Israel’s best interest, but rather his own. In other words, being pro-Israel meant giving some tough love to an Israeli prime minister whom Biden saw as steering Israel away from the shared values that have bound Washington and Jerusalem together for decades.
In two of his statements this week, Biden said he urged Netanyahu to approach Gaza in keeping with the “rules of war.” This will not be easy when Hamas is a terror group whose only rule is that there are no rules.

"The Trust Biden Built with Israelis Doesn’t Come with a Blank Check," October 13, 2023

Rumley

Were the conflict to expand, however, with other Iran-aligned actors like Hezbollah joining in, the Biden administration would have to examine potential military involvement through three lenses. The first is how the administration assesses Israel’s ability to deal with a multi-front war on its own. This would include Israel’s assessments of its own capabilities as well, and whether Jerusalem would request more direct U.S. involvement. The second is whether U.S. forces or civilians currently in the region are under threat or have already been engaged in hostilities. And the third is whether Biden faces significant public pressure to intervene militarily. Short of becoming a direct participant, however, the United States can consider other ways to deter additional actors from becoming involved. This could include creative shows of force by U.S. assets in the region, such as demonstrating the carrier strike group’s capabilities through drills (either independently or with partner forces) and exercising simulated missions off the coast of Lebanon to send an additional deterrent message to Hezbollah and Iran.

In any protracted conflict, the United States would likely need additional congressional funding not only to supply Israel with existing platforms, but to ramp up domestic production lines.

"U.S. Wartime Support to Israel: First Steps and Future Considerations," October 12, 2023

Palti

The fact that [Senate Minority Leader] Mitch McConnell (R-KY) backed up the president and spoke in a completely bipartisan voice is encouraging. [Israelis] are grateful that Congress will probably approve whatever the president will propose. We don’t take it for granted. It is outstanding that America knows how to unite in a crisis.

"The Israel-Hamas War and U.S. Policy: An Update," by David Makovsky, Zohar Palti, Grant Rumley, Neomi Neumann, and Ghaith al-Omari, October 18, 2023

 

Who Will Rule Gaza?

 

Satloff, Ross, Makovsky

The ultimate goal should be for the Palestinian Authority to return as Gaza’s legitimate government. Yet the PA lacks the will and ability to do that job in the foreseeable future—it does not want to be seen as reentering the Strip on the backs of Israeli tanks, and it is not in any shape to take on additional governmental responsibilities in Gaza given its failings in the West Bank.

Therefore, the situation demands the establishment of an interim administration to run Gaza until the PA is able to assume that role. The duration of this interim period depends on meaningful, substantive PA reform, without which neither local Palestinians nor international donors would have confidence in the PA’s ability to extend its authority to Gaza. Such reform would also have the crucial benefit of boosting the PA’s legitimacy in the West Bank.

"Israel’s War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza," October 17, 2023

Levitt

If Israel can achieve its security goals and severely cut Hamas off at the knees and make it so that the group is not capable of doing anything like this, or much less at least for a long period, then they will pull out [from Gaza]. There will still be whatever is left of a Hamas leadership there to run the Gaza Strip and then the day after conversation will not be who runs the Gaza Strip but what are the conditions for any type of resumption of aid, etcetera, if, in fact, Hamas continues to rule there. But I don't think the Israelis or anybody else has any interest in going in and trying to rule again.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023

Ross

The Palestinian Authority will not want it to seem that it returned to the strip on the back of Israeli tanks, but if asked by the UN to play a role it might do so—and would also seek some Arab cover. Arab governments could provide that cover, and contribute to international pressure to help manage that transition, with Egypt’s proximity making it a natural partner, along with some credible European governments that have experience in reconstruction and enforcement effort. Aid for reconstruction of Gaza must be tied to demilitarization of the strip.

"What Israel Must Do: Disarming Hamas Will Be Costly but Essential for Peace," October 11, 2023, Foreign Affairs

Yaari

Ultimately the Palestinian Authority, which would have been the obvious address, cannot [rule Gaza] because of its weakness, its lack of legitimacy, credibility, etcetera. I think a serious effort should be made to rebuild the Palestinian Authority, not through throwing money at it, because we know what's going to happen to this money with all the corruption, but really re-engaging in a clear, strong, directed institution-building project for the Palestinian Authority to enable again to come and fill a vacuum in the West Bank and later on in Gaza.

"The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy," by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, Oct 13, 2023