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منع اشاعه

Policy Analysis on منع اشاعه

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Brief Analysis
Iranian-European Nuclear Deal:
An Achievement with a Potential Poison Pill
The October 21 deal between Iran and the European trio of Britain, France, and Germany has the potential to significantly reduce the risk of Iran producing a nuclear weapon from highly enriched uranium (HEU)—assuming the accord is implemented strictly and on a tight timetable. Yet, HEU is only one of
۲۲ اکتبر ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Patrick Clawson
Brief Analysis
Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option:
The Saudi-Pakistani Summit
On October 18, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia will begin two days of talks in Pakistan. One of the subjects that may be discussed is the potential transfer of Pakistani nuclear missiles to Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has long been suspected of funding Pakistan's nuclear program; given recent revelations
۱۶ اکتبر ۲۰۰۳
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  • Simon Henderson
In-Depth Reports
The Iranian Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy (Part IV)
To begin, I would like to make three points. First, it has become clear in recent months that Iran has a clandestine nuclear program, parts of which were recently revealed and parts of which may remain hidden. Second, Iran may be just two to four years from getting the bomb
۱۹ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۳
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  • Michael Eisenstadt
In-Depth Reports
The Iranian Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy (Part III)
There were traditionally two Israeli schools of thought on Iranian proliferation. One viewed Iran as a major problem because of the nature of the regime that took power in the 1979 revolution, the line that the regime took in Lebanon opposing any negotiations with Israel, and its heavy involvement in
۱۹ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۳
In-Depth Reports
The Iranian Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy (Part II)
Discussing U.S.-Iranian relations in the aftermath of the Iraq war and in light of recent international pressure to rein in Iran's nuclear ambitions is not an easy task. There are contending players and policy options that both countries may pursue -- depending on their respective political dynamics at home. The
۱۹ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۳
In-Depth Reports
The Iranian Nuclear Threat and U.S. Policy (Part I)
I have been asked to address Iran's nuclear program from a technical point of view. One of the roles the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has played is to push for more effective nuclear inspections worldwide. That often means more intrusive ones, and Iran has attracted a lot
۱۹ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۳
Articles & Testimony
Evaluating the Options Regarding the Iranian Nuclear Threat
Testimony before the U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee The United States has for years judged Iran to be the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism. While the most direct way to sever the link between Tehran and its main terror arm -- Hizbollah -- is via Damascus, Washington is vigilant about Iran's
۱۷ سپتامبر ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Patrick Clawson
Brief Analysis
Gaining Support for Action on Iran's Nuclear Program
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose report about Iran leaked out yesterday, will soon have to decide whether to declare Iran noncompliant with its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What the world does about Iran's nuclear program will largely determine the future of
۲۷ اوت ۲۰۰۳
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  • Patrick Clawson
Brief Analysis
Iran's Nuclear Program—Countdown?
DAVID ALBRIGHT The IAEA's February 2003 visit to Iran revealed that Tehran's nuclear program was much more advanced that previously thought, raising questions about Iranian compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This issue will be a major topic at the upcoming meeting of the IAEA
۱۳ ژوئن ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Michael Eisenstadt
Brief Analysis
Iranian Nuclear Weapons (Part III):
How Might Iran Retaliate?
A U.S. or "coalition" strike against Iran's nuclear program would be an exercise in high-stakes compellence. Although the physical results of such a strike (e.g., amount of damage inflicted; number of years by which the Iranian nuclear program would be set back) are uncertain, the consequences for U.S.-Iranian relations are
۲۹ مهٔ ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Jeffrey White
Brief Analysis
Iranian Nuclear Weapons (Part II):
Operational Challenges
Counterproliferation strikes on nuclear sites are uncommon but by no means unprecedented. Germany's embryonic nuclear program was attacked during World War II, Iraq's Osiraq nuclear plant was bombed by Iran in 1980 and by Israel in 1981, and Iran's Bushehr reactor site was attacked by Iraq throughout 1984-1988. During the
۲۸ مهٔ ۲۰۰۳
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  • Michael Knights
Brief Analysis
Iranian Nuclear Weapons (Part I):
The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Action
Having just fought a war to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, and alarmed by fresh signs of dramatic progress by Tehran in the nuclear arena, the United States is pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare Iran in violation of its commitments under the Treaty on
۲۷ مهٔ ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Michael Eisenstadt
In-Depth Reports
Winning the Peace in the Middle East:
A Bipartisan Blueprint for Postwar U.S. Policy
In the aftermath of war, the United States must balance recognition of the historic opportunity to advance U.S. interests in the Middle East with a realistic view of what is possible and what is not. America's first priority must be to win the peace by stabilizing Iraq and helping the
۱ آوریل ۲۰۰۳
Brief Analysis
Iraq's Nascent Nuclear Doctrine:
Insights from a Captured Document
During Operation Desert Storm, U.S. forces captured several million Iraqi military documents. Among these was one titled "The Operational Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Volume 2; Part 2; Foundations for the Use of Nuclear Weapons in War." The manual was published in July 1988 by the Ministry of Defense
۱۲ مارس ۲۰۰۳
Brief Analysis
Iraq's al-Samoud:
A Missile with Great Possibilities
A dispute is rapidly growing between UN inspectors and Baghdad concerning Iraq's stockpile of al-Samoud missiles. The UN is expected to order the destruction of these missiles today. According to Hans Blix, executive chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, the fact that these missiles are capable of
۲۱ فوریهٔ ۲۰۰۳
Brief Analysis
Iran's Nuclear Program:
Gathering Dust or Gaining Steam?
As the United States looks to disarm Iraq and to defuse or defer a nuclear crisis with North Korea, another nuclear crisis -- with Iran -- looms on the horizon. U.S. policymakers could face critical decisions this year regarding Iran's nuclear program as the Bushehr reactor approaches completion, as Iran's
۳ فوریهٔ ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Michael Eisenstadt
In-Depth Reports
Classifying Evil:
Bush Administration Rhetoric and Policy toward Rogue Regimes
Language matters in international policymaking, and terms such as "rogue," "outlaw," and "hostile" can help mobilize democratic publics against states that actively attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), proliferate long-range missiles, and sponsor international terrorism. For President George W. Bush, the attacks of September 11, 2001, reinforced the
۱ فوریهٔ ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Raymond Tanter
Brief Analysis
Iraq Crisis after the Blix Report:
Diplomatic and Military Options
On January 27, Hans Blix, director of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), delivered a straightforward report to the Security Council regarding Iraqi compliance with arms resolutions. Twelve years after taking up the obligation to disarm under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, Baghdad still does not genuinely
۳۱ ژانویهٔ ۲۰۰۳
◆
  • Patrick Clawson
  • Philip Gordon
  • Michael Eisenstadt
Brief Analysis
Missiles and Diplomacy:
The Middle East's Dangerous Mix
The temporary seizure by the Spanish navy last week of a ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen was a reminder of the extent of missile proliferation in the Middle East. Similarly, Yemen's insistence on receiving the missiles, despite U.S. pressure, is a reminder of how much priority
۲۳ دسامبر ۲۰۰۲
◆
  • Simon Henderson
Brief Analysis
Iran's Nuclear Activities:
What Might the IAEA Learn?
Satellite photos published last week showed two sites in Iran that might house a civilian energy program and/or a nuclear weapons program. To determine exactly what purpose these sites serve would require an on-site inspection. Yet, inspections performed by international regulatory agencies are bound by certain limitations. What are the
۲۳ دسامبر ۲۰۰۲

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