اسرائیل

The lesson of this current episode with Abbas should be that more research is called for to throw light on this half-forgotten chapter of history to refute such claims. Only more accurate information can help remove the Khazars from the shadows of mystery and antisemitism and place them instead in the correct historical context.

Leadership dynamics make a two-state breakthrough impossible at the moment, but an Israeli-Saudi accord could help—so long as everyone honestly acknowledges what the situation would be like without Oslo.

While insufficient, a collapse of the Oslo edifice would come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination.

The Oslo Accords were seriously flawed but now must be preserved. Some of the mistakes can probably be fixed over time to make sure the historic agreement does not remain a breakthrough into a dead end, but instead paves the way towards a stable compromise between Israel and the Palestinians.

As we look back at the legacy of the accords, it is not the Oslo Accords that failed us, but Israelis and Palestinians who failed Oslo.

In Gaza, most residents are strongly supportive of increased Arab involvement in the conflict and half are open to normalizing ties with Israel were Saudi Arabia to do so. A majority of West Bank residents, however, remain hesitant about such a proposal.

The history is clear—well-intentioned intervention in an ally’s domestic politics often triggers bigger problems, and the president’s stance could conjure a self-fulfilling prophecy about the erosion of U.S.-Israel ties.

Although some of the arguments for decreasing U.S. military assistance to Israel stem from understandable impulses, implementing such ideas now would only embolden enemies and make conflict more likely.

A closer look at the domestic dynamics behind the legislature’s vote sheds light on whether and when it might affect Israel’s military readiness and relationship with Washington.