Policy Analysis

Though it may seem counterintuitive, the Middle East stands a decent chance of becoming more stable in the coming year if Trump takes advantage of Iran’s weakness to broker good deals.

One of Iran's most trusted lieutenants in the Iraqi militia scene is loudly rattling his saber against the U.S. presence in the Middle East.

Even as they celebrate the demise of Assad’s dictatorship, U.S. officials should take a “verify, don’t trust” approach to HTS, judging the group by its actions on the ground before considering the removal of sanctions.

To preserve its only reliable and capable partner in the fight against the Islamic State, the United States must help the SDF deter HTS and fend off Turkey-backed militias.

Tehran’s past efforts to reconstitute the group have passed through more difficult environments than post-Assad Syria, but an economical U.S.-led effort can complicate future smuggling efforts and further other counterterrorism goals in the process.

Comparing the offensive that toppled Assad with the Islamic State's 2014 campaign in Iraq shows how HTS has innovated its approach by mixing old and new tactics.

To prevent Russia from cutting permanent deals with the rebels or otherwise salvaging its defeat, Washington must take the reins of the coming transition process.

Despite his latest tweets about staying out of the Syria crisis, Trump has a history of working with Turkey on these issues and has several carrots to offer HTS as well.

Despite the welcome blow to Iran's axis, Israel’s must now protect its border communities in the Golan and ensure that the Assad regime's strategic weapons don't end up in the wrong hands.

From stability in Jordan to the future of Kurdish autonomy, Lebanese sovereignty, and Iranian nuclear proliferation, officials must prepare quickly to prevent or manage—and in some cases even encourage—further shocks in the Middle East.

Abu Mohammad al-Jolani has worked for years to rebrand himself, but has he truly broken from his extremist past?

The dictator’s rigidity at the negotiating table and within Syrian society left him with scant support when he needed it most, giving Washington a window for pushing a Syrian-led transition and cutting Iran’s axis for good.

The group has been greatly diminished by a year of war, but the Lebanese people won’t feel the difference unless the international community pushes Beirut and the LAF to reestablish trust and authority.

Policymakers would be wise to view Pezeshkian’s rise not as a development that will change Iran, but as a reflection of a regime that is struggling to stave off domestic troubles.

In addition to carefully managing moves on the Golan, Israel should focus on facilitating humanitarian assistance to the Druze, mending relations with Turkey, and convincing Trump to maintain America’s military presence in Syria.

By adding Britain ahead of Trump’s inauguration, the parties hope to sustain the agreement’s vision of building an integrated defense structure and forming a network of trusted partners for economic and technological development.

Even as global attention is turned toward major transition questions in Damascus, the international community cannot lose focus on the fight against the Islamic State—an essential part of which is ensuring the security of northeastern detention facilities.

The director of the Syrian Emergency Task Force joins three Washington Institute experts to discuss the stunning rebel advances in the west.

The former head of Israel’s “tripartite” delegation reflects on the slow-rolling failures that followed the 2006 ceasefire—lessons that can help authorities overcome similar obstacles to the new agreement.

The West should move quickly to exploit Moscow's long series of bad strategic moves.