Choices and Strategies for Dealing with Iran

On April 24, 2008, Ambassador Dennis Ross testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security. The following is an excerpt from his prepared remarks.

When President George W. Bush assumed office in 2001, Iran was not a nuclear power state. However, when he leaves office next January, Iran will either have acquired that status or be on the verge of having done so. Listen to its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and you hear that Iran has 3000 operating centrifuges and is now installing an additional 6000 IR-2 centrifuges that will be five times as efficient as those already operating. Even if President Ahmadinejad exaggerates the exact status of the Iranian efforts, the Iranians probably will solve the technological problems that have limited their ability to operate their centrifuges on a non-stop basis within a year's time. And, once they have done so, they will be able to enrich uranium and stockpile fissionable material.

If nothing else, this tells us that our current policies are not going to prevent Iran from acquiring the capacity either to assemble nuclear weapons or build a break-out capability. It tells us as well that the next administration will have fewer options available and less time to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. In my testimony today, I will address our stakes in preventing Iran from going nuclear, its vulnerabilities that provide us leverage, and the range of different options we might employ to alter Iran's behavior before it is too late. . . .

Read the full text of his remarks (PDF, 260 KB)

This testimony is based on Ambassador Ross's March 2008 Iran Strategy Paper Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran: Where Are We? How Did We Get To This Point? And What Should We Do Now? (published by the Center for a New American Security). Read the full paper (PDF, 3.4 MB).