Policy Analysis

The current stalemate between the two adversaries will persist unless ISIS overreaches or Turkey becomes more proactive in clamping down on jihadists.

The moderate rebel force currently envisioned by Washington would take far too long to arrive on the battlefield and could be easy prey for ISIS and Assad.

The treaty's trade and security benefits have been considerable, though many Jordanians continue to reject the likely economic windfall that full normalization could bring.

In a political environment that seeks a return to the status quo ante, some Egyptians are embracing a Mubarak-era strategy of leveraging patronage networks and governmental connections for victory.

A rare poll conducted last month in three Gulf Cooperation Council states demonstrates decisive rejection of ISIS and a surprisingly high level of popular support for peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- but also substantial minority support for both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

The discontent and chaos in the Middle East are rooted in treaties drafted at the close of World War I.

Given its recent track record of targeting Israelis, Hezbollah's decision to take public responsibility for a new border attack likely has more to do with burnishing its domestic "resistance" credentials than sending a deterrent signal to Israel.

As the palace dispatches bombing sorties and mitigates immediate threats posed by ISIS, the ongoing dynamic in Syria guarantees a growing and potentially destabilizing reservoir of Jordanian popular sympathy for the group.

By revealing all the offers that Iran has rejected, Washington could block Tehran's potential Plan B, which will likely involve constructing a reasonable public image in order to erode the international sanctions regime.

As prices drop to around $80 per barrel, more attention is being focused on the mindset of Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter.

The former chief of staff to Israel's defense minister discusses the pros and cons of the interim nuclear agreement with Iran and the prospects for continued negotiations past the upcoming deadline.

Given the violent message the group continues to convey in Arabic to viewers young and old, it will be difficult to achieve full Palestinian reconciliation, a long-term ceasefire with Israel, or large-scale reconstruction of Gaza.

New polls show that the group has curried little favor in key countries, but the nuances behind the numbers have important implications for U.S. policy toward Syria, Iran, and other actors.

The pundits have it wrong -- the group's move toward Baghdad is a sign of desperation.

As a leading general once said of past insurgencies in the region, “The only way to defeat guerillas is with better guerillas."

A local jihadist group has claimed a Libyan city in the name of ISIS, showing how the "Islamic State" could flout traditional notions of territorial contiguity by expanding its "borders" well beyond Iraq and Syria.

In a September 10 television appearance, Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk suggested that Hamas might engage in direct talks with the Israelis. The surprising comment, made following Hamas's costly summer military engagement in Gaza, reflected the group's desperate need for a period of calm, with its weapons stockpiles depleted and

Ankara's security and political concerns may drive it to establish buffer zones unilaterally, while Washington's hesitance could cost it a coalition.

Officials at this weekend's summit should reinforce the message that Hamas is not a legitimate go-between for reconstruction assistance, while also pressing PA officials for practical answers about their plans in Gaza.

The quick fall of Yemen's capital could push the country toward the Syrian model of sectarian strife, but it also presents an opportunity for reform led by a new political player.