Policy Analysis

America’s institutional knowledge about global jihadist terrorism took decades to accumulate, but it could disappear much faster.

The United States is safer from catastrophic terrorism, but emerging technologies, weakened international partnerships, and allied military drawdowns in Africa are creating new blind spots.

Three top former counterterrorism officials look back on a quarter-century of combating the global terrorist threat, discussing how their setbacks and successes can help Washington fill gaps in its current CT approach.

Hezbollah and Amal are already manipulating where donor funding goes and who gets credit for reconstruction, so Washington and its partners should coordinate ways to bypass them before the country’s wider reconstruction effort begins in earnest—starting with the first batch of “pilot zones.”

Given the lack of Lebanese political will on display so far, the Trump administration and Congress need to take a tough-love approach.

Faced with brain drain, ideological distortion, and a wavering strategic focus, U.S. counterterrorism officials are being asked to do more with less today than their predecessors post-9/11.

Although America’s defensive and preventive mechanisms are much stronger today, the global jihadist situation in 2026 is uncomfortably similar to the 1990s, when the movement was treated as a manageable nuisance even as it quietly consolidated sanctuaries, built financial autonomy, and experimented with new methods of attack.

Given the kingdom’s simultaneous push for more technological autonomy and more American business deals, Washington should seek deeper—but conditional—cooperation that is closely tied to the broader strategic partnership.

Although the outcome is unlikely to affect core U.S. policy issues such as the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco’s participation in Gaza peacekeeping efforts, Washington should remain vigilant about the potential political impact of widespread disaffection, especially among the kingdom’s younger generations.

U.S. officials have demurred when asked about targeting Tehran’s most crucial Chinese lifelines, and Beijing has plenty of trade and export leverage to continue deterring Washington.

America can win if it maintains the blockade on Iran while gradually increasing pressure; the challenge is to ensure that Tehran doesn’t respond by starting another region-wide conflict.

Targeting a UAE-based bank with a serious but time-delayed action could have beneficial cautionary effects—though the wider problem of illicit Iranian financing in the Emirates will require a more concerted and lengthy Treasury Department campaign.

The visit will probably confirm the growth trend in Egypt and China’s economic, technological, and perhaps even defense relations, though Cairo is unlikely to get the help it wants on regional security threats posed by Iran and the Houthis.

Congress has sought to condition U.S. support on fighter headcounts, but this approach alone won’t address the threats that are actually materializing in post-Assad Syria—in fact, it may wind up repeating mistakes made with past jihadist mobilizations.

If done astutely, absorbing SDF personnel into the central government can preserve years of U.S. relationship-building and institutional knowledge while giving Washington a unique channel to build trust with Damascus.

As the army, the RSF, and civilian forces debate this question, the international Quintet faces growing obstacles to building an inclusive political process.

With Assad-era laws increasingly triggered by private complaints and enforced unevenly, U.S. officials can no longer relegate these issues to secondary tracks or assume that core administration objectives will remain unaffected.

Ukrainian cooperation with Gulf states on drone and counter-drone technologies is expanding as they contend with similar threats and concerns, so Washington should do whatever it can to enable and coordinate this growth.

In launching its newly announced “Operation Economic Outcast,” the Trump administration’s primary beachhead should be the UAE, which has signaled a shift in the right direction but will need targeted U.S. help with cutting off illicit Iranian transactions.

Libyans are fed up with temporary solutions, but Washington’s current approach is structured to be just that—another transitional phase that lets political elites keep postponing elections and reform.