Policy Analysis

In September 2000, the Palestinians made a strategic decision to abandon the Oslo process and prepare the groundwork for a struggle with Israel, which was to be conducted by means of terror and violence. Two years later, the armed conflict persists, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to finance and

On October 5, 2002, Zalmay Khalilzad, special assistant to the president for Near East, Southwest Asian, and North African affairs, addressed The Washington Institute's 2002 Weinberg Founders Conference. The following are excerpts from his remarks, edited for readability. Read an edited transcript of his full remarks, including the question-and-answer session

President George W. Bush recently articulated his case for liberating Iraq before the world at the United Nations, but unfortunately, his speech stands alone, not part of a larger, focused public diplomacy strategy. In fact, America's public diplomacy campaign is rudderless and, at times, counterproductive. One of the most glaring

Note: Mr. Khalilzad's remarks represent his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government. Bob Goldman: My name is Bob Goldman. I'm a member of the Executive Committee of the Institute. One year ago when we met here the focus of our conference was the aftermath of September

I recently read the United Nations (UN) Arab Human Development Report from one end to the other. It was the most miserable thing I have read in a long time. The report reveals the presence of a number of deficits in the Arab world. One of them is a freedom

The last two years of violence deserve a lot of analysis. In looking at the underlying strategic components of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, I have come to the conclusion that certain matters must be discussed openly and clearly between the two sides. If there is disagreement, it is

Martin Indyk proposes an ambitious, groundbreaking path. The other path described by David Makovsky and David Satterfield is a less ambitious one, based on an assumption that it is the only realistic option. I would differentiate between the "process" approach that you heard from the two Davids and what I

I would like to preface my remarks with some thoughts about the fine speech that Zalmay Khalilzad made earlier in these proceedings. As good a speech as it was, it made our job on this panel more difficult. I am more confused now about what kind of Iraq the United

Most Arabs believe that the world is busy twenty-four hours a day plotting against them. There is no reason for it. The Arab mind must learn to differentiate between competition, struggle, and conspiracy. Life is full of struggle and competition, but the world certainly is not busy with conspiracy against

Note: Mr. Satterfield's remarks represent his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government. I will speak on behalf of the incremental approach, not because we believe that the trusteeship or mandate options are intrinsically wrong or flawed, but because we do not see a reality on the

In order to have my remarks put in the right context, I would rephrase the title of this session as "The Regional Implications of Regime Change in Iraq as a Result of External Military Action." Were change to come as a result of other actions -- by the Iraqi people

Patrick Clawson, The Washington Institute: I want to say a few words about the standards of success by which we should judge progress in Iraq after Saddam Husayn's regime is deposed. Two issues are of particular importance: weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and democracy. Because any war against Iraq will

The situation is bleak. But there are some glimmers of hope that are worth acknowledging. These glimmers are significant because they come from within -- from the Palestinians themselves. Ninety-one percent of Palestinians want reform; 83 percent say the Palestinian Authority is corrupt; and, for what might have been one

Those expressing concern about the prospect of regime change in Iraq fall into two groups: those who are afraid that the intended change will fail and those who are afraid that it will succeed, with the latter group being the more vociferous. As others have said repeatedly, the long-term objective

*Mr. Pillar's remarks represent his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government. [Due to an unfortunate technical problem, the panelists' opening presentations were not recorded. An edited transcription of the panel's question-and-answer session follows.] Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute: One of the more important elements driving the

We are at a stalemate. Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat is able to thwart any real political reform on the Palestinian side. Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon has no good military options left, and, given the fact that he has the prospect of a primary and then elections coming up, he

Note: Mr. Khalilzad's remarks represent his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government. I want to give you the Bush administration's perspective on where we are and what our vision is for Iraq. We believe that Saddam Husayn's regime is determined to retain, expand, and once again

*Mr. Khoury's remarks represent his own views and not those of the U.S. government. Robert Satloff, The Washington Institute: The basic premise of this panel is that the United States is currently promoting coercive democratization in Iraq and in the West Bank and Gaza. U.S. policy is coercive in the

Ladies and gentlemen, I am now going to read a legally recorded telephone call: "Hello! Hello! Rescue me! My house has caught fire! Help!" "Define your terms exactly. Has your house caught fire or has it burst into flames?" "Both! It has caught fire and it has burst into flames!"

A little more than a year ago, the most vile terror attack in the history of mankind took place in the United States, devastating the principal symbols of American military and economic power, indeed the very symbols of freedom and capitalism in the eyes of the world. September 11 --