Policy Analysis

American strategy in the Gulf crisis has now entered a new phase of "coercive diplomacy." Sanctions backed by force have a better chance to coerce Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than the alternative of a long-range, sanctions-only strategy. For the strategy to work, however, three basic and difficult requirements will

With the prospect of 100,000 more U.S. troops in the Gulf and a heightened chance of war, some argue that the anti-Iraq embargo will reduce Baghdad's fighting ability. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. Any loss is likely to be far smaller than expected. In addition to stopping Iraq from acquiring

A sanction-induced economic crisis cannot be counted on to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, much less out of office. Iraq has good prospects of surviving sanctions through the end of 1991 by a combination of tightening consumer's belts and loosening the socialist tourniquet now tied around the Iraqi private

Last week's meeting between President Bush and Yevgeny Primakov, Mikhail Gorbachev's special emissary to Iraq, generated much speculation about a possible Soviet diplomatic initiative to end the Gulf crisis. Those expectations were overblown. While Primakov provided Bush a first-hand account of his discussions in Baghdad with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein

The assassination of a major Egyptian political figure, reportedly by Iraqi-backed terrorists, raises questions about Egypt's stability as well as its staying power in opposing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. One of the main pillars of the anti-Iraq coalition, Egypt is beset by mounting political and economic difficulties. If it

For now, the Bush administration eschews the use of force while preparing for its use. But what will happen if a consensus develops that President Bush's diplomatic and economic approach is ineffective while a full-scale attack on Iraqi forces remains unattractive? As an additional buildup of U.S. forces gets underway

As the President nears his moment of decision in the Gulf crisis, he is being urged by many policy experts to adopt a long-term, diplomacy-only strategy for dealing with Iraq's aggression. But Secretary of State Baker's dismissal of "partial solutions," the President's refusal to rule out force, and reports of

In the Persian Gulf today, as so often in international affairs, keeping one's options open seems an attractive alternative. In the long run, however, this is really an illusory choice since the course of events may be determined by decisions taken by others or unforeseen complications. To govern, as the

The growing linkage between Soviet domestic and foreign policy is producing dramatic changes in its Middle East positions. The Soviet regime is playing a key role on some aspects of the Gulf crisis, but its freedom of action is quite constrained in others because of the internal struggle for power

Last week's decision by the Soviet Union to establish consular relations with Israel is just one element of a far-reaching evolution in Moscow's Mideast policy. Accelerated by the shock of the Persian Gulf crisis, this process is drawing Soviet views on the Arab-Israeli conflict closer to those of the United

The recent violence in Jerusalem has again raised fears that Iraq can utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to break the coalition opposed to its aggression. An accurate assessment of Saddam Hussein's support among non-Iraqi Arabs is critical to understanding this question, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on

As the United States enters the third month of its deployment in the Persian Gulf, there is increasing concern about what Saddam Hussein could do to undermine American will or reverse Iraqi diplomatic isolation. Given the array of forces against it and faith in an ability to outlast the world

The visit of Soviet special envoy Yevgeny Primakov to Baghdad today in search of a diplomatic resolution of the Gulf crisis is another sign of Moscow's growing interest in the crisis as a catalyst for a new Soviet role in the Middle East. Last Sunday's decision to establish diplomatic relations

Of all the states in the Middle East, Iran's policy has been the most confusing and mysterious. Yet a close examination shows that Tehran has followed a consistent, predictable, attitude toward the Gulf crisis. From Tehran's standpoint, the current situation is the obverse of that prevailing during the eight-year Iran-Iraq

"Will sanctions against Iraq work?" is a question too ambiguous to be useful. It leaves unspecified such key issues as what we want sanctions to accomplish and how Iraq would react if sanctions started to pinch. And, then, how much does Saddam Hussein care about what happens to Iraq's economy

One of the most controversial statements during this crisis was Secretary of State James Baker's call for a new Persian Gulf security framework. If Saddam Hussein and/or Iraq's military might survive this confrontation, local states will face continued threats. For them to cooperate with the United States now they must

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is using the Gulf crisis as a catalyst for farreaching changes in Moscow's Middle East policy. Moscow is putting the emphasis on improving relations with the West and with the wealthy Persian Gulf states at the expense of Arab radicals. Shevardnadze's UN speech was remarkable

Impatience and doubts about the slow-working process of diplomacy and economic sanctions has led many to call for quick military action against Iraq. While the United States could eventually prevail in such a conflict, the anticipated high cost in American casualties will make President Bush less eager to pursue a

By the time Washington finishes arguing about who lost Kuwait, a new debate may have to be joined about the failure of U.S. policy toward Jordan. The Kuwait crisis is drawing King Hussein into Saddam Hussein's orbit with profound consequences for the stability of the Middle East heartland and the

Saddam Hussein's threats to attack Israel or Saudi oil fields if sanctions begin to strangle him must be taken seriously by defenders of those purported targets but are most likely bluffs to forestall the mounting pressure on Iraq and raise his subjects' morale. It is not clear that Iraq has